Political Economy of
Communication
Vincent Mosco
Queen’s University, Canada
Abstract:
In this paper five major
trends in the political economy of communication are addressed: the
globalization of the field, the expansion of an enduring emphasis on historical
research, the growth of research from alternative standpoints, especially
feminism and labour, the shift from an emphasis on old to new media, and the
growth of activism connected to the political economy tradition. None of these
are brand new tendencies but rather build on existing ones, which were often
submerged beneath dominant trends in the field. Nonetheless, the outcomes of specific
struggles within each of these domains suggest that political economists have
made significant contributions to the overall resurgence of activism around
major communication issues.
Keywords:
Political Economy of Communication; Globalization; Feminism;
Labour; History of Communication; Activism Vincent Mosco 46
Résumé:
Dans cet article, cinq
tendances en économie politique des communications sont abordées : la
mondialisation du domaine; l’expansion de l’accent mis sur la recherche
historique; la croissance de recherches menées dans des perspectives
alternatives, surtout féministe et de travail; le déplacement d’une insistance
sur les vieux médias aux nouveaux; et une croissance de l’activisme associé à la
tradition de l’économie politique. Ceux-ci ne sont pas des nouvelles tendances,
mais plutôt construis sur des tendances déjà existantes qui étaient submergées
sous les tendances dominantes du domaine. Cependant, le résultat des efforts
spécifique de chacun de ces domaines suggère que les économistes politiques ont
fait des contributions signifiantes à la résurgence de l’activisme à travers
les questions importantes en communication.
Mots-clés:
Économie Politique de Communication; Mondialisation; Féminisme;
Travail; Histoire de la Communication; Activisme
This
paper addresses five major trends in the political economy of communication,
including: the globalization of the field, the expansion of an enduring
emphasis on historical research, the growth of research from alternative
standpoints, especially feminism and labour, the shift from an emphasis on old
to new media, and the growth of activism connected to the political economy
tradition. None of these are brand new tendencies but rather build on existing
ones, which were often submerged beneath dominant trends in the field.
The
Globalization of Political Economy
The
political economy of communication has always contained an important
international dimension. For example, two founding figures, Dallas Smythe and
Herbert Schiller, joined Armand Mattelart to assist the Chilean government of
Salvatore Allende to build a democratic media system. Moreover, research
outside the developed core began as a response to what was perceived to be
media imperialism in the West. Nevertheless, on balance, most of the research
in political economy had nationalist tendencies and distinct regional emphases.
For example, the bulk of Smythe’s major book Dependency Road addresses
Canada’s dependency on U.S. media and asks why the Canadian nation-state
permitted this to continue for so long. Nationalism became an alternative to
U.S. media imperialism. Similarly, resistance to Western media domination over
the developing world was met with calls for national resistance along the lines
of the national liberation movements that had won independence for many nations
after World War II. In addition to the tendency to focus on nationalist
resistance to globalizing media, political economy developed specific regional
tendencies that made it difficult for scholars to work together across their
spatial and intellectual divides. Today, these regional differences have
substantially diminished. Political economists from different regions are
working together on common projects (Calabrese & Sparks, 2004; Wasko &
Murdock, 2007) and it is no longer Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication 47
unusual to see research from one region taking up themes that were
once prominent in another (Artz, Macek & Cloud, 2006; Mansell, 2004).
North American scholarship has made substantial contributions to
political economic theory, once the primary emphasis of European research. This
includes research on the integration of digital technologies into a capitalist
economy (Schiller, 1999), the relevance of Marxian theory to communication
scholarship (Artz, Macek & Cloud, 2006), and the application of autonomist
theory to social movements that make use of new media (Dyer-Witheford, 1999).
It also is just as likely that one would find concrete studies of media
problems, once the focus of North American work, such as the commercialization
of media and the decline of public media, in European scholarship (Mansell,
2002; Sparks, 2007). Finally, while it is the case that scholars from
developing societies are still concerned about issues of media imperialism,
witness their involvement in the successor movement to the NWICO, the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), there is just as much evidence that
scholarship in the former Third World has taken a strong interest in the growth
of political economic theory (Chakravartty & Zhao, 2008; Liu, 2006; Review
of African Political Economy, 2004).
The process of globalizing political economy research is
proceeding rapidly. Some of this is the result of the sheer movement of
scholars, a development that has sped up over the last two decades. For
example, the Canadian political economist Robin Mansell established a base for
institutional political economy at the London School of Economics. Yuezhi Zhao,
who has provided the foundation for a political economy of China’s media and
telecommunications system, moved from that country to the United States and
from there to Canada establishing important connections among scholars in all
three countries.1 One of her students A.J.M. Shafiul Alam Bhuiyan (2008)
came to Canada from Bangladesh and has produced important work on political
economy from the perspective of a postcolonial subject. The Korean political
economist Dal Jong Yin moved to the University of Illinois, Urbana and worked
with Dan Schiller to complete a dissertation on the political economy of
telecommunications in South Korea. He has since joined Yuezhi Zhao and Robert
Hackett to continue the historically strong presence of a political economy
perspective at Simon Fraser University in Canada.
In addition to formal and informal movements of scholars across
regions, universities with a strong political economy orientation have
established an institutional base concentrating on international research. For
example, the University of Westminster, where Nicholas Garnham helped to found
the political economy perspective, has established, under the leadership of
Colin Sparks, a major global research program with particular strength in the
study of communication systems in the Middle East and in China. Similarly, John
Downing, who was once based in the UK, has led the Global Media Research Center
at Southern Illinois University.
At a more formal level, scholarly associations have been active in
their support of global research. The International Association for Media and
Communication Research (IAMCR) was founded in 1957 and, for many years, was the
only global academic society that supported political economy research, making
the political economy of communication one of its major sections. The
organization continues to grow and to support political economic research with
an international orientation. Under the leadership of its recent president
Robin Mansell and through the hard work of political economy sections heads,
including Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa, the IAMCR provides a
genuine home to political economists worldwide. The establishment of the
Herbert Schiller and Dallas Smythe awards to recognize the work of young
scholars offers the kind of recognition and incentive for continuing the
political economy tradition that these founding figures were so instrumental in
developing. Vincent
Mosco 48
The general growth of
academic journals has assisted the process of globalization but specific examples
have been especially helpful to political economy, including this journal.
Founded in 2002 by the political economist Yahya Kamalipour of Purdue
University in the United States, The Global Media Journal has featured
critical, especially political economic, research. By 2008, the journal
appeared in eleven different editions including African, Arabic, Australian,
Canadian, Chinese, Indian, Mediterranean, Pakistani, Persian, Polish, Spanish,
and Turkish. In addition to content from practically everywhere in the world,
the linguistic range assures a genuinely global character. Additionally, the
Union for Democratic Communication, a U.S-based organization of critical
scholars and media practitioners, has established The Democratic Communique,
a journal that strongly supports political economic research.
One might reasonably wonder what this means for the content of
research in political economy. Aside from more research, has this process of
global expansion made a difference for what political economists have to say?
The primary difference is that current research addresses the profound
integration of the global political economy and its media systems. Heretofore
the focus was on how one (the U.S.) or just a handful (U.S. plus E.U.) of
nation states and their own corporations dominated weaker states and their
nascent economies in the process of producing little more than dependency and
underdevelopment. Today the emphasis is on the integration of corporations,
states and classes across national, regional and even developmental divides
(Mosco & Schiller, 2001). In the view of Chakravarrty and Zhao (2008), this
involves the creation of a “transcultural political economy,” which they
document in a book containing contributions from primarily non-Western scholars.
Where once, corporations, including those in the communication
industry, were based in one country and moved through the world as an external
force, today they are increasingly integrated into the fabric of societies to
the point where it is often difficult to determine their national origin.
Operating as owners, partners, and in strategic alliances with companies based
in the host country, they have led political economists to shift from talking
about the power of multinational corporations to addressing the rise of a
worldwide transnational economy. Many of these companies originate in the West
but the growth of other economies, especially the Chinese and Indian, render
simplistic many of the standard models of Western domination. India, for
example, which has traditionally been portrayed, quite accurately, as the
victim of British and then general Western imperialism, now contains its own
transnational firms that have integrated into Western economies, including
those of North America. Conglomerates like Tata, Infosys, WiPro, and ICICI have
strong bases in North America employing hundreds of thousands of workers, many
of whom are eventually dismissed because, after training their own
replacements, their jobs are outsourced back to India. They also train North
America students as interns and operate their own outsourcing ventures
throughout Latin America (Mosco & McKercher, 2008).
Political economic research also has documented the restructuring
of public authorities including nation states, regional blocs, global
governance organizations as well as describing their integration into the
commercial sector to produce hybrids that blur the distinction between public
and private at every level of government activity. Again, it is no longer just
a question of demonstrating how a large corporation “captures” a government by
getting it to steer policies and resources to big business. Rather, we are
witnessing the thorough integration of both forms of power in a
transnationalization of political authority (Braman, 2007). As a result,
intra-national social class divisions, which once occupied the bulk of social
class analysis in political economy, are now less significant than
transnational class divisions that restructure networks of power across nations
to link newly wealthy people in China, India and Russia to their counterparts
in Current
Trends in the Political Economy of Communication 49
the United States and
Europe. Indeed, any examination of the media elite needs to start with those
who run large companies in the United States, but is increasingly incomplete
and downright inadequate until it addresses those who wield media power in
numerous other states. This would now include, for example, the Chinese
executives who own and operate Lenovo, what was once the personal computer arm
of IBM, an icon of U.S. dominance in the high tech sector.
Much of this activity is aimed at establishing a new international
division of labour with the communication industry in the forefront. By
creating global labour markets and by making extensive use of communication
technologies to carry out the restructuring process, transnational business
gains the flexibility to make the most effective, least costly, and therefore
most profitable use of labour. Students of culture have spent a great deal of
time charting the transnationalization of culture (Lash & Lury, 2007;
Tomlinson, 1999). Much of this work has enriched what we know about the social
production of meaning worldwide. But political economists and some students of
culture are making up for a yawning gap in that research: the
transnationalization of the labour that produces culture as well as the other
material and immaterial products of contemporary society.
The global integration of corporate, government, and social class
structures is a work in progress. It is fraught with risks, tensions and
contradictions. There also is considerable opposition—evidenced in the rise of
social movements that have protested this development at meetings of
international agencies like the World Trade Organization and other
international bodies like the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS)―which aims to extend opposition into the communication industry.
Political economists have not only examined these developments, they also have
taken praxis seriously and participated at the political and policy levels. In
doing so, they acknowledge the importance of the trend to transnationalize the
political economy of communication. They also recognize the need to create
transnational democracy and a genuine cosmopolitan citizenship.
A
Political Economy Approach to the History of Communication
Recent
years have brought about significant growth in the amount of historical
research and important departures from earlier work. Research from the mid-1990s
to the present has continued the trend to pursue historical analysis from a
political economy perspective. More significantly, it has departed from more
traditional forms of historical analysis in communication studies.
Specifically, current political economy research demonstrates that media
systems in place today are the result of a deeply contested history, involving
not just duelling capitalists and their allies in government, but labour
unions, citizens groups, consumer cooperatives, religious enthusiasts, and
social justice organizations of all stripes. McChesney (1993) firmly
established the importance of this approach in his analysis of the battle for
control over radio in the United States. Neither above politics, nor the
privileged policy domain of a handful of elites, radio broadcasting was
recognized early on as crucial to democracy and numerous social movement
organizations used what power they had to democratize the medium. They did this
by fighting for stations that trade unions, local communities and public
interest organizations of all types could control for themselves. They fought
for citizen access to the airwaves to counter the dominant corporate control of
broadcasting. And they fought to democratize the policy process by making the
case for popular control over regulations that gave and took away licenses,
that assigned spectrum to services, and that established rules for the fair use
of the medium. In Vincent Mosco 50
essence, the struggle for radio was the struggle for democracy.
More than the instrument of a handful of pioneers, or the esoteric magical
diviner of the air, radio was embedded in the most significant political
battles of the twentieth century, pitting supporters of the New Deal against
the dominant conservative forces which generally held the upper hand in
American politics.
Radio was a central instrument of what Denning calls “the cultural
front” a movement extending from the late 1920s to the early 1950s in the
United States that provided the cultural energy for attempts to establish
alternatives to America’s traditional power structure led by big business. In
addition to New Deal liberals, it included social democrats, socialists and
some communists. It gained strength in the Great Depression and withered in the
1950s when business marshalled a massive counter attack, including the
reactionary movement known as McCarthyism. Communication scholars writing
history today from a political economic perspective are explicitly and
implicitly telling the detailed story of the media’s role in the cultural
front. Some have continued to enrich the story of radio. For example, Nathan
Godfried (1997) examines the history of a Chicago radio station that was
established and run by a labour federation representing unions in that city. Providing
a voice for labour in a sea of commercial broadcasting was no easy task,
particularly since many of the unions, whose members were also big fans of
commercial stations, struggled to define a labour alternative. In the face of
enormous commercial and business pressures, WCFL (for Chicago Federation of
Labor) was able to retain its unique character through the 1940s, providing
both news and entertainment from a labour standpoint. Returning to WCFL,
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf (2006) describes the broader role of radio in the effort
to build a democratic Left in twentieth century America. She tells the story of
several alternatives to commercial radio, and describes the political battles
that pitted labour and its allies against business in some of the central
policy debates of the time. These included decisions about granting and
renewing broadcast licenses, determining the limits of station ownership,
setting rules about acceptable content, and deciding precisely what should be
the requirements to air diverse perspectives (see also Fones-Wolf &
Fones-Wolf, 2007).
Political economy has also addressed the historical trajectories
of other media, especially print journalism. For example, Tracy (2006) has
written about the crucial role of the International Typographical Workers Union
in battles to control the labour process and the introduction of new
technologies in the printing industry. These culminated in a 1964 strike that
shut down the newspaper business in New York City for four months. Drawing on
interviews with the leader of the labour action, Tracy documents labour’s once
powerful voice in the media industry and assesses its strengths as well as its
weaknesses, such as hanging on to a narrow craft ideology that ultimately
contributed to muting that voice. My research with Catherine McKercher extends
this view by telling the story of the battles between craft and class among
communication workers throughout the history of American media (see also Mosco
& McKercher, 2008).
As political economists who study media concentration have
demonstrated, one of the ways business was able to defeat those calling for
more democratic communication and press for a singular commercial form of media
was through cross-ownership or the purchase of multiple media located in a single
community or region. But that also met with strong opposition from coalitions
of citizen and labour organizations (Fones-Wolf & Fones-Wolf, 2007). The
battle for control over Hearst-dominated media in San Francisco provides a
stunning example of a company that refused to tolerate the slightest deviation
from a conservative viewpoint in either print or broadcast media.
One also can find major recent examples that document the history
of resistance in the telecommunications and computer industries. Countering the
traditional great inventor, Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication 51
technicist, and
pro-corporate readings of AT&T’s story, Venus Green (2001) examines the
significant interplay of race, gender and class in the company’s history. Dan
Schiller (2007b) recounts the struggles in the workplace and in policy-making
circles that challenged business efforts to control the postal and telephone
system. Pellow and Park (2002) take the analysis into Silicon Valley by telling
the story of the struggles first of indigenous people, then of agricultural
workers, and now those of immigrant women who do the dirty hardware work and of
more privileged but often exploited young software workers.
This is not just an American tale. Political economists north of
the U.S. border have also worked in this heterodox form of history. It is one
of the truisms in countries with a national broadcaster like the BBC or the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporations, that such institutions provide a public
defence against universal commercialism. But in her groundbreaking research on
media history in Canada, Patricia Mazepa (2003, 2007) demonstrates that the
story is significantly more complex. And unlike academic complexity which often
does not appear to matter, hers makes a difference for how we think about
public media and for what we do about it. Drawing on archival sources, Mazepa
shows that the CBC developed not just to defend against commercial broadcasting
crossing the border from the United States, but also to protect against
alternative definitions of “public” embodied in the media produced by
immigrant, socialist and labour organizations in Canada that the national
broadcaster generally ignored. In Canada, public broadcasting came to be
associated with white settler media, mainly English, and a largely elite French
version based principally in the province of Quebec. As a result, community and
regional media developed by organizations outside the mainstream was not deemed
to be fit for the CBC. Immigrant, socialist, and labour media went up against
both commercial media and the state. And the state often demonstrated far less
tolerance and considerable eagerness to use its policy powers to undermine
media emerging from outside the CBC and big private broadcasting. Mazepa’s work
uncovers the largely ignored story of media production and resistance from
below. It calls on scholars, especially those involved in the process of making
broadcasting policy, to question the meaning of “public” in public
broadcasting. Indeed, it broadens that definition to incorporate genuine
democratic alternatives as opposed to those that predominantly represent a
white settler vision of Canada.
Writing about the history of journalism in Canada, McKercher
(2002) charts the conflicts that erupted over control of the labour process,
the use of technology, and the shape of the news. These were not simply
established by those who owned the presses or imposed by the changing
technologies in the workplace. They arose from strikes and other labour actions
as well. Several of these opened spaces for workers and for those who wanted or
needed a more diverse press. Many of them fell far short of success, but her
historical work, like those of other political economists described in this
section, offers a genuine alternative to the standard stories. In doing so, it
gives back to social activists and workers the agency that is rightfully
theirs.
Standpoints
of Resistance
Historical
research in the political economy of communication has begun to emphasize
resistance and not just the admittedly important story of how the powerful
dominate. The emphasis on resistance is increasingly generalized in research on
the contemporary political economy marking a shift in the central standpoint
from a focus on capital, dominant corporations, and elites to alternatives that
draw from feminist and labour research. This marks a departure from a trend
that has been a hallmark of political economy from the start: focus on media
concentration Vincent Mosco 52
and on the erosion of content diversity (Bagdikian, 1992; Green,
1973; Herman & Chomsky, 2002).
Recent research in the political economy of communication
recognizes the importance of this work but argues in favour of a departure. One
of the models for this type of thinking is feminist standpoint theory which
maintains that social science needs to be practiced and society needs to be
understood from the standpoint of women’s rather than men’s experience, as has
been the case for so much of what has passed for general social science.
Developed by Hartsock (1999) in the early 1980s, feminist standpoint theory has
flourished in the work of Harding (2003), Haraway (2003) and others who
maintain that women’s subordination provides a uniquely important basis for
understanding a wide array of issues from the most general philosophical
questions of epistemology and ontology to such practical issues as the
appropriate social science techniques to deploy in research. While this
perspective has faced charges of relativism from inside and outside feminist
scholarship (Haraway, 2003), it counters with the claim that feminist
standpoint theory offers a genuine alternative to the equation of science and
universalism with research by and about men, as well as to the reduction of feminist
research to work that only documents the exploitation of women.
Feminist standpoint thinking has begun to influence research in
the political economy of communication. One of the first major attempts to do
so is contained in a collection by Eileen Meehan and Ellen Riordan. Meehan has
made extensive contributions to political economy, most notably by extending
the work of Dallas Smythe on the question of how the audience is made into a
marketable commodity. In 2002 Meehan and Riordan produced Sex and Money which
gathered the work of leading feminists and political economists to address the
relationships between these perspectives. Specifically, it describes how
political economic and feminist standpoints contribute to understanding
capitalism at many different levels including the personal, experiential,
institutional, and structural. For example, Balka’s chapter on women’s work in
the telecommunications industry starts from the lived experience of women as
they understand what she calls “the invisibility of the everyday.” This
includes how women experience the detailed measurement and monitoring of their
work as well as their attempts to gain some control over it. Her description of
this process is connected to a political economic analysis of the industry
which, in the region of Atlantic Canada which she studied, is undergoing
intense change. Specifically, the shift from regulation in the public interest
to a more intense commercial model leads companies to eliminate jobs and, using
advanced technologies, impose tighter controls on those that remain. This
gendering of political economy offers a rich reading of an experience that all
too often is simplistically described as the inevitable consequence of
technological change and global imperatives. Chapters such as this enable
Meehan and Riordan to provide the empirical detail that carries out a genuine
integration of feminist and political economic theory.
In their 2007 book Feminist Interventions in International
Communication Sarikakis and Shade take a further step to advance a feminist
standpoint. This volume engages with central issues that political economists
address but from a more explicitly feminist starting point. Like many political
economic analyses, the book addresses power, technology, labour, and policy but
it views them from the entry point of gender. So, for example, the
globalization of media industries is tightly connected to women’s employment in
media and new technology. In using a feminist standpoint, they enable us to
rethink the study of international communication. Yes, traditional issues such
as flows of news between rich and poor nations, do matter. But international
communication is also about policies for women’s development, media production Current Trends in the
Political Economy of Communication 53
of pornography, media
representations of HIV/AIDS and global campaigns to bring an end to this
plague. It also is about the location of women in the new international
division of labour, especially media and high tech labour, and what women are
doing about workplace exploitation. In essence, Sarikakis and Shade demonstrate
that international communication is not gender blind; nor is it a field that
simply describes a set of impacts on women. Rather, they and the contributors
to their volume, demonstrate how women can shape international communication, from
production through employment to policy and their book takes an important step
by seeing all of these as women’s issues.
There is a strong and growing literature that has taken off from
the issues addressed in these two books. The work of Micky Lee (2006, 2007) and
McLaughlin and Johnson (2007), among others, clear an enormous amount of ground
in addressing political economic power from a feminist standpoint. Their work
ranges from media, through telecommunications, and on to information
technology, from consumption to production, and from home to office (see also,
Huws, 2003; Mosco & McKercher, 2008). There is also interesting work on
feminist standpoint theory that spans political economy and cultural studies by
examining how audience performances can be viewed as performances of power that
defend or resist a dominant ideology (Atkinson, 2005).
This section concludes by taking up new departures in political
economy research from a labour standpoint. Communication studies in general has
done a more thorough job of addressing media content and audiences than it has
communication labour. The research on labour internationalism expanded in
subsequent years and a genuine labour standpoint has begun to emerge. My work
with Catherine McKercher demonstrates different dimensions of this expansions
(McKercher & Mosco, 2006; McKercher & Mosco, 2007; Mosco &
McKercher 2008). For us, while it is important to understand how corporate
power, new technology, and conservative governments are changing labour, it is
equally important to determine what labour is doing about this phenomenon. We
identify two important developments. The first is the creation of labour
convergence which brings together trade unions from separate areas of the
communication industries into one large union representing journalists,
broadcasters, technicians, telephone workers, and those employed in the high
tech world. Two major examples are the Communication Workers of America and its
Canadian counterpart the Communication Energy and Paperworkers Union. The
development of integrated unions that span the converging media and information
technology industries provides the resources to better face the power of
transnational business. The CWA demonstrated this by carrying out an effective
action against the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation when the national
broadcaster locked out its workforce because it had refused to accept a shift
to part-time labour and contracting out. Believing that a union which brought
together high-paid performers and lower-paid technicians would not remain
unified, especially one led by a union from the United States, the CBC locked
out its workers anticipating a rapid decline in solidarity. Using its financial
resources and international networks, the CWA provided the support needed to
carry on and the workers not only demonstrated their solidarity across
occupational and social class lines, they were also able to enlist audiences to
their side. After seven weeks, CBC management backed down. Other cases have not
been so successful but enough success has been achieved to see some promise in
the return of a One Big Union movement, this time in the communication
industry.
A second labour strategy is the formation of worker associations
which emerge out of social movements that aim to address a significant problem.
In his book Cyber-Marx, Nick Dyer-Witheford takes a social movement
standpoint to address opposition to capitalism around the Vincent Mosco 54
world today (see also
Hackett & Carroll, 2006). He is especially focused on how social movements
use new media to counter the transnational political economy. In this respect,
the growth of what Marx called the General Intellect lives on in
information-rich and media-savvy movements that resist and demonstrate
alternatives to the status quo. McKercher and I have given attention to this
among workers who develop new movements and organizations in the world of
informational or knowledge labour. We pay particular attention to workers on
either side of a major divide in the communication industry: technical
employees, such as those who produce software like new code for computer
systems and cultural workers, primarily those who produce media content. The
Washington Alliance of Technology Workers or WashTech has built a movement of
contract computer workers that has achieved some success at Microsoft and has
also been in the forefront of efforts to address the problem of outsourcing
high tech jobs to India and to other foreign locations (see also Brophy, 2006;
Rodino-Colocino, 2007). Moreover, the Freelancers Union in the United States
has grown rapidly from a movement of people who work on a short-time, contract
basis for media companies that pay low wages and provide few, if any, benefits.
Organizations like these are redefining the nature of the labour
movement by fostering a rethinking of trade unionism and by connecting its
activities to wider political and social issues. For political economy, they
demonstrate the importance of taking a labour standpoint (see also Kumar,
2007). Focusing on worker self-organization captures an enormous range of
activities and problems that are simply not addressed in traditional research
that concentrates on how capital exploits workers. Both are important, but it
is time to restore the balance by describing the active agency of communication
workers. This has political implications because one of the central issues of
our time is determining whether technical and cultural workers can come
together. More broadly, it is not just about what will be the next new thing
(i.e., the latest technological gadget), but rather, whether communication
workers of the world will unite.
The
Transition from Old to New Media
Some
political economists have responded by emphasizing continuities between old and
new media. For them, old media issues endure in the world of new media. For
others, the emphasis is on discontinuities or the new connections that the
networked media make possible. Still others have focused a sceptical eye on the
promises that new media experts and gurus promote, while some concentrate on
newer issues that today’s media raise. To understand how political economists
approach the shift from older to newer media, it is useful to consider each of
these points.
Political economy has tended to give considerable attention to
describing and analyzing capitalism, a system which, in short, turns resources
like workers, raw materials, land, and information, into marketable commodities
that earn a profit for those who invest capital into the system. Political economists
of communication have focused on media, information, and audiences as resources
and charted the ways in which they are packaged into products for sale. Many
who make the shift from the study of old to new media emphasize the
continuities between old and new media capitalism. For them, new media deepen
and extend tendencies within earlier forms of capitalism by opening new
possibilities to turn media and audiences into saleable commodities. As a
result, media concentration, commercialism, rich nation dominance over the
global economy, divisions between information rich and poor, and militarism
persist and grow (McChesney, 2007; Murdock & Golding, 2000, 2004; Schiller,
1999, 2007a; Sparks, 2007; Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication 55
Wasko, 2003). To paraphrase
the title of one of Dan Schiller’s books, new media may lead us to call it
“digital capitalism,” but it is still capitalism and there is no doubt about
which is the more important term.
Within such a framework, social and technological change does take
place, as new technologies expand the market and global governance becomes
necessary, but it also creates problems for capitalism. What was once a largely
national market for film and video products and audiences is now a global one,
posing serious challenges for coordination. In such markets, what was once a
largely national system of governance and government regulation has proven to
be inadequate. Global systems of governance are necessary if only to insure the
coordination of something as complex as the Internet address system. As a
result, we have a new alphabet soup of international organizations such as the
ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) which provides
Internet addresses. However, such solutions create new problems as the U.S.
tries to protect its interests by controlling the ICANN and many of the world’s
nations protest because they view it as little more than an extension of
American power. Nevertheless, amid the changes, contradictions, opposition, and
conflict, there is a consistency in the central tendency to deepen and expand
the capitalist market system.
For other political economists, the emphasis is on discontinuity
and departure from these tendencies in capitalism. Hardt and Negri (2001,
2004), Lazzarato (1997) and Dyer-Witheford (1999) remain political economists
because they are concerned about the power relations that mutually constitute
the production, distribute and exchange of resources. However, as a result of
the growth of new media, they view those power relations differently than do
those who focus on continuity in capitalist relations. Their autonomist
perspective, so named because it starts from the autonomy of the working class,
maintains that capitalism is propelled by the energy and activity of those who
work within it. From this perspective, the focus needs to be placed on the
self-activity and self-organization of what Hardt and Negri refer to as “the
mass,” the vast majority of people typically viewed as exploited from other
critical perspectives. Furthermore, the growth of communication and information
technology does not just serve capitalism, it significantly disrupts it. There
are three major ways this happens.
Capitalism is based on the market and a system of private
property. Both require legal controls that set limits on what people can do.
Copyright, trademark, and patent law constrain people’s use of information and
ideas that others own. Markets establish the value of products including the
information products that are increasingly prominent today. According to
autonomists, the widespread availability of information and communication
technology makes it very difficult for capitalism to preserve the legal regime
of private property that historically limited flows of communication and
information. It is now more difficult than ever to figure out what capitalism
is doing when technologies challenge traditional ideas of production and
consumption, use and exchange value. The ease of freely downloading music and video,
of sharing files containing data, audio, and video, and of copying material of
all sorts, challenges the ability of capitalism to maintain and police its
property and market regimes. Like the common lands that were once widely
available to all until capitalism made them private property, cyberspace was
once available to all. But in order to make money it too needs to be turned
into property, in this case the intellectual property of Microsoft, Google,
Disney and the other commercial giants (Terranova, 2000). But unlike the
commons of old, cyberspace is difficult to fence in because it is a
fundamentally immaterial resource.
For the autonomists, capitalism faces a second challenge. Although
communication and information technologies provide it with the tools to manage
and control large numbers of people Vincent Mosco 56
from anywhere on the globe,
these tools are also available to the masses of people and at relatively low
cost. For the autonomist, not only does technology challenge property and
market rules, it enables people to disrupt the system just at a time when
capitalism requires careful global coordination. For example, electronic social
networking permits social movements to mobilize and coordinate as never before.
The vast expansion in the number of people skilled at producing disruptive
software, who can hack and crack open seemingly secure programs, creates
critical problems for private property, markets and the overall ability of
capitalism to maintain authority.
Finally, the autonomist concludes that the very immaterial labour
that capitalism requires to carry out more and more of its work presents
serious problems for maintaining control and discipline. Capitalism needs a
highly educated workforce but such a workforce is less likely to cede control
over thought and ideas to management than did its blue collar predecessors.
Whether employed in developing software or working at a call centre, knowledge
workers are less likely to submit to rigid time and motion controls. And the
very attempts to loosen rules and introduce a more playful atmosphere into the
workplace lead to more questioning of the need for any rules, including those
that determine who profits from labour. How do you manage a “no-collar”
workforce (Ross, 2004)?
In addition to approaches emphasizing continuity and disjunction,
the political economy of communication has responded to new media in a third
way, by taking a skeptical view of the enthusiasm that inevitably accompanies
it. This has been particularly important in historical work which demonstrates
that much of what is considered new and revolutionary in new media was actually
associated with every communication technology when old media were new. For
example, Winseck and Pike (2007) address the concept of convergence which has
become a popular notion in contemporary discussions of what is new about
computer communication. Convergence denotes the technological integration that
powers new media technologies (Jenkins, 2006). It also refers to the
integration of big companies that make use of new media. In essence
interconnected technologies and large integrated companies create the
convergence it takes to make a revolution. Skeptical of the view that
convergence is unique to new media, Winseck and Pike demonstrate that convergence
is as old as the telegraph and that the promises and challenges we associate
with the Internet were anticipated by that mid-nineteenth century technology
(see also Standage, 1998).
It is not just the social relations of capitalism that retain
continuity, there also is nothing new about the hyperbole or mythologies that
accompany today’s media. Martin (1991) has described the promises associated
with the telephone in much the same way. Whereas the telegraph was expected to
bring about world peace, she documents the expectation that the telephone would
end the exploitation of women because it would permit them to run a household and
participate fully in society. Similar research has examined the Internet.
Flichy’s work on l’internet imaginaire (2007) views the Internet as more
than just a tool or a social force. It also embodies a myth, by which he means
a narrative containing both utopian visions of alternative realities and
ideological discourses about how we should conduct our lives and organize
society in a period marked by proliferating computer and communication
networks.
This work is also important because it reflects a stepped-up
interest among political economists to demonstrate the continuity between old
and new media by engaging with culture, something that I called for in the
first edition of The Political Economy of Communication and which was
exemplified in The Digital Sublime (2004). Drawing on the work of Martin
and others, The Digital Sublime demonstrates that the same promises made
about the Internet have Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication 57
been made when old
technologies, like the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television, were new.
World peace, gender equality, online education, racial harmony- all of these
were once viewed as the inevitable consequences of these once new media. For
believers, the Internet will realize all of these promises and more, including,
in the work of MIT professor Raymond Kurzweil, an end to death as we know it.
Ultimately, digital technologies imagine the end of history, the end of
geography, and the end of politics. Those who advance these views, I maintain,
are doing something prominent throughout the history of “new” media. They are
invoking technology as an opportunity to achieve the sublime or the experience
of transcending the constraints of everyday life (including time, space, and
social relations) to achieve a utopia beyond language. Once the province of art
and literature (the sublime painting or poem), and of nature (e.g., the sublime
Grand Canyon), the sublime is now to be achieved through technology and,
increasingly, through communication technology.
Demonstrating continuity and a link to culture are important. But
it also is important to return to political economy and to document how all of
this matters for the study of power. First, those who have made important
contributions to studying the sublime do not give enough attention to the
connections between constructing the sublime and marketing, whether selling the
latest computer, video game, or political candidate. Visions of transcendence
make for great advertising. Second, connecting new media to the end of history,
geography and politics freezes into near inevitability and permanence the
current political economy. The message is simple and powerful: There is no
sense struggling over the control of transnational capital if there is no
likelihood of ever creating an alternative. Finally, the sublime can mask the
often banal world of everyday politics. New York’s World Trade Centre was to
embody the sublime new world of informational capitalism that transcended old
political relations founded in an industrial era, until the cataclysm of 9/11
when history returned with a vengeance. The seductive lure of the sublime can
blind its seekers from the banal and terrible politics that lurk just around
the corner.
The fourth response of political economy to new media is to
address problem areas that are particularly significant in this cycle of
development in communication and information technology. One should be hesitant
to call them new issues because there are really no significant problems that
political economy has neglected to address. Rather, there are issues that are
particularly important today and, among the major ones, copyright/intellectual
property issues, surveillance, and the tendency toward what some call a network
economy are worth some comment.
From the time of Charles Dickens, who railed against what he
considered the failure of the U.S. to pay royalties for his novels when they
were distributed in the United States in the nineteenth century, copyright has
been a hot topic in debates around media. For media scholars today, including
political economists, the debate has stepped up because new media make it easier
to copy and share work under copyright. Bettig (1996; see also Bettig &
Hall, 2003) has written about how business uses copyright to tighten its
control and Schiller (2007a) and Zhao (2008) have studied the intellectual
property challenge from China and other developing nations. Who will control
intellectual property is one of the central questions facing political economy
today.
So too is the threat of electronic surveillance. As Lyon (2003)
and others have demonstrated, new media make it possible for governments and
companies to monitor our activities on an unprecedented scale. The so-called
war on terror has accelerated the spread of surveillance and legitimized
activities that were once considered unacceptable violations of Vincent Mosco 58
personal privacy. Political
economists have addressed the extent of the problem and have also begun to
document what can be done about it (Kiss & Mosco, 2006).
Finally, as the work of the autonomists demonstrates, new media
call into question traditional economic categories and the capacities of
capitalist economies to control them. But political economists outside the
autonomist orbit are also wondering about the challenge of new media to the
understanding of economics. Specifically, should we begin to think about the
emergence of a network economy and the need for a network economics to address
it? Network economics argues that the value of goods shift in a world of
electronic networks. In particular, the worth of a product or service increases
when others buy the same good or service, especially when the purchase connects
people in a network (Mansell, 2004; Melody, 2007). New media are based on
networks of cell phone users, Internet users, participants in social networking
sites, etc. Traditional economics, it is argued, undervalues additions to the
network because it does not take into account the geometrical expansion in the
number of potential transactions that an addition to the network makes. The
question for political economists is what does this do to its conception of
power? In other words, is network economics also political economy?
Media
Activism
Praxis,
or the unity of research and action, is a fundamental characteristic of a
political economy approach. Most political economists of communication have
been activists as well as scholars, involved in media democracy, development
communication, independent media and universal access work, as well as with
labour, feminist, and anti-racist movements. The Union for Democratic
Communication, which was created in the early 1980s, continues to bring
together activist-scholars and media practitioners. The International
Association for Media and Communication provides a global forum for political
economists, including those active in public policy work, such as its recent
President Robin Mansell. Where once political economists like Herbert Schiller
and Armand Mattelart worked to make UNESCO a focal point to build a New World
Information and Communication Order, politically active scholars are
concentrating on democratizing the Internet through the international project
known as the World Summit on the Information Society.
Important as these developments are, one of the most significant
advances in political activity has been the creation in 2002 of the Free Press
by the political economist Robert W. McChesney (2007). The organization has
been a focal point for the remarkably resurgent media reform movement in the
United States that has brought together a diverse collection of public interest
groups including the Consumers Union, the Center for Digital Democracy, the
Media Access Project, and the Consumer Federation of America. These have joined
with independent media organizations, such as Democracy Now! a daily, national,
independent news program hosted by journalists Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez.
Free Press has attracted enormous attention including the support of well known
people like Bill Moyers, Jane Fonda, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson. It has
sponsored an annual conference on media reform that has attracted literally
thousands of people including scholars, media activists, politicians, and trade
unionists. In the past such meetings might bring together at most hundreds of
people, suggesting that we are observing a populist upheaval around the issue of
media reform.
The upswell in the media reform movement can be attributed to the
widespread view that the elimination of rules restricting media ownership,
providing for some measure of content diversity, and limiting the prices that
major cable, satellite, and other media firms can charge Current Trends in the
Political Economy of Communication 59
consumers, has threatened
what remains of media democracy, media quality, and universal access to
essential services. The loss of nearly 200,000 media jobs, out of about 1.1
million in the United States over the past five years, demonstrates for many
that media concentration is an enormous labour-saving project that is eroding
the quality of journalism and what remains of its independence. To counter
these tendencies, Free Press mobilizes activists, lobbies politicians, and
makes use of the media (including Bill Moyers’ own public television show) to
press for alternatives. These include ending the concentration of old and new
media in the hands of a few giant transnational firms, supporting content
diversity and vigorous debate, and creating social policies that guarantee
universal access to essential telecommunications and Internet services.
Of particular importance is the fight to
preserve “network neutrality.” As pressure mounts on large media firms to
increase profits, companies are tempted to restructure their networks to make
more money. Specifically, they would like to create a system of faster and
slower “lanes” on the information highway, reserving the faster lanes for
higher paying content providers, such as certain advertisers, or for those
linked to the network service provider, such as its own subsidiaries. Traffic
would move more slowly for those paying less and for competitors. One important
consequence is that the web sites of companies outside the mainstream,
including alternative media sites, which do not have the funding to pay the
premium for a fast lane, would only be available in lesser quality. Responding
to this threat, the media reform movement has fought for legislation and
regulations that would preserve what has been the standard practice, with a few
exceptions, of treating all content equally- with what amounts to one highway
at one speed, delivering one standard of quality. Whatever the outcome of these
specific struggles, it is evident that political economists have made a
significant contribution to the overall resurgence of activism around major
communication issues.
Introduction to Political Science I: Democracy in
Theory and Practice
Tuesday, 9:35 – 11:25
Please confirm location on
Carleton Central
Instructor: Professor Achim
Hurrelmann
Office: B640 Loeb Building
Phone: (613) 520-2600 ext. 2294
Office Hours: Tuesday and
Thursday, 1:00 – 3:00 p.m.
Email:
achim_hurrelmann@carleton.ca
Course description:
This course is one of two
first-year lectures in the Department of Political Science that give an
overview of the discipline and its major subfields. PSCI 1100 will introduce
core ideas of Western political theory (the state, democracy, freedom,
distributive justice, citizenship, etc.), and will then examine what impact
these ideas have had on political institutions and policy making in Canada. In
addition, PSCI 1100 will also introduce students to basic study, research, and
academic writing skills needed to succeed in the social sciences.
The main objective of the
course is to acquaint students with selected themes and issues discussed in
three subfields of Political Science: Political Theory, Canadian Politics,
Public Policy Analysis. PSCI 1200 will discuss the subfields of Comparative
Politics and International Relations. Students who complete both courses will gain
an overview of the range of topics discussed in Political Science, and will
hence be in a good position to make an informed choice of second-year Political
Science courses.
Textbooks:
All required readings for the
course have been compiled in a custom-edited textbook, available (only) at the
university bookstore. It is mandatory that students purchase this book,
which compiles chapters from six different textbooks. (The original sources
have been put on reserve at the MacOdrum Library, but there is only one copy
for 400 students):
Ø Baradat,
Leon P., et al. 2012. Introduction to Political Science Volume 1: Democracy
in Theory and Practice, 2nd custom edition. Toronto: Pearson.
In addition, it is recommended
(but not mandatory) to purchase a research and writing guide for university
students, which will be useful for your entire Political Science career. The
best one that I know of is the following, which is also available at the
university bookstore:
Ø Scott,
Gregory M., and Steven M. Garrison. 2011. The Political Science Writer’s
Manual, 7th edition. Boston et al.: Longman.
Evaluation:
The final grade in PSCI 1100
will be based on the components below. In addition (and although there is no
formal grade component for this), regular attendance in the lectures is of
utmost importance. It has been clearly proven that students who attend all
lectures tend to get better grades than students who do not. Please do the required
readings associated with each session in advance of the lecture, and check
the course’s cuLearn page before each session for new material.
Participation in discussion
groups 10%
Research assignment 10% (Due
date: 2 Oct 2012)
Final paper 40% (Due date: 20
Nov 2012)
Final exam 40% (Exam period,
6-19 Dec 2012)
Participation in discussion
groups: All students must attend
a discussion group on a regular basis. It is expected that students do the
required readings in preparation for the group sessions, and that they
contribute actively to the discussion in the groups. Participation marks will
be based on attendance as well as quantity and quality of oral contributions.
Teaching assistants (TAs) will give further instructions on these points.
Research assignment: In order to provide early feedback to students on
their performance in the course, there will be a short research assignment
testing students in the study and research skills introduced early in the term.
Topics covered include the identification of relevant academic sources as well
as the compilation of bibliographies. The assignment will be posted on cuLearn
on Sept 17; it is due one Oct 2. The assignment must be completed by individual
students acting alone. Group work is not permitted. Textbooks and other course
material may be used. The assignment will be evaluated and returned in the
discussion groups on Oct 16.
Final paper: The main written assignment will be a paper of 6-8
pages (12 point font Times New Roman, double spaced, i.e., 2000-2500 words).
There will be a list of topics for students to choose from, which will be
posted on cuLearn by Oct 16. Advice on research strategies, time management,
and structuring a paper will be given in class. It is expected that papers will
follow the rules for citation and referencing which have been discussed
throughout the term; marks will be deducted from the paper grade if this is not
the case.
Final exam: There will be a three-hour exam at the end of term,
which will take place during the formal exam period (Dec 6-19). The exam will
be a combination of multiple choice, short answer, and essay questions. It will
cover all of the course material, including the required readings. Advice on
exam preparation will be given in class.
Submission of Coursework:
All written
assignments must be submitted as hardcopies to the instructor at the
beginning of the lecture. For late assignments, the drop box in the Department
of Political Science may be used. This box is located outside of the
departmental office (B640 Loeb Building); it is emptied every weekday at 4 p.m.
and papers are date-stamped with that day’s date. Unless a specific exception
has been arranged, assignments sent per email will not be accepted.
Written assignments will be returned in the discussion groups (not in the
lectures). The final exam can be viewed during the instructor’s office hours,
but will remain in the university’s possession. Unless a medical (or
equivalent) excuse is provided, late assignments will be penalized by two (2)
percentage points per day (including weekends); assignments more than a week
late will receive a mark of 0%. Unexcused failure to show up for the final exam
will result in a grade of 0% on the exam.
For Religious Observance: Students requesting accommodation for religious
observances should apply in writing to their instructor for alternate dates
and/or means of satisfying academic requirements. Such requests should be made
during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for
accommodation is known to exist, but no later than two weeks before the compulsory
academic event. Accommodation is to be worked out directly and on an individual
basis between the student and the instructor(s) involved. Instructors will make
accommodations in a way that avoids academic disadvantage to the student.
Instructors and students may contact an Equity Services Advisor for assistance
(www.carleton.ca/equity).
For Pregnancy: Pregnant students requiring academic accommodations
are encouraged to contact an Equity Advisor in Equity Services to complete a letter
of accommodation. Then, make an appointment to discuss your needs with the
instructor at least two weeks prior to the first academic event in which it is
anticipated the accommodation will be required.
Plagiarism: The University Senate defines plagiarism as
“presenting, whether intentional or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work
of others as one’s own.” This can include:
• reproducing or paraphrasing
portions of someone else’s published or unpublished material, regardless of the
source, and presenting these as one’s own without proper citation or reference
to the original source;
• submitting a take-home
examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or
in part, by someone else;
• using ideas or direct,
verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without
appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
• using another’s data or
research findings;
• failing to acknowledge
sources through the use of proper citations when using another’s works and/or
failing to use quotation marks;
• handing in
"substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once
without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the
submission occurs.
Oral Examination: At the
discretion of the instructor, students may be required to pass a brief oral
examination on research papers and essays.
Submission and Return of
Term Work: Papers must be handed
directly to the instructor and will not be date-stamped in the departmental
office. Late assignments may be submitted to the drop box in the corridor
outside B640 Loeb. Assignments will be retrieved every business day at 4
p.m., stamped with that day's date, and then distributed to the instructor.
For essays not returned in class please attach a stamped, self-addressed
envelope if you wish to have your assignment returned by mail. Please note
that assignments sent via fax or email will not be accepted. Final exams are
intended solely for the purpose of evaluation and will not be returned.
comparative politics
In comparative politics, we examine how political processes work within
states
and why political changes occur within societies. We are interested
primarily in domestic (internal) politics, and we seek to explain the
similarities and differences between particular countries. In this course, we
focus in particular on the states of the world’s North, primarily in Europe and
North America. However, the course will consider issues arising from other
parts of the world where relevant: the boundaries between “North” and “South”
are in continual flux. Traditionally, comparative politics has focussed
primarily on political systems, with a strong emphasis on the role of state
institutions. However, as in all fields of political science, we must be
attentive to the increased role of globalization. Comparative politics is
continually redefining itself in response to unexpected events in the world
(the Arab Spring is a good example of a recent event that has shaped our
understanding of political change).
Comparative politics is a rich,
complex and changing field of political science. Rather than to attempt to
cover all countries and concepts, the instructor’s approach is to focus on
selected questions and problems, and to introduce concepts, terms and examples
through the course of examining those questions. Assigned readings include a
mix of textbook chapters and short articles: the textbook provides a solid
grounding in key concepts, while journal articles are chosen to highlight a key
debate or to explore examples of particular political problems. Case studies
will be used as an aid to provide a bridge between lecture content and research
skills. Students are encouraged to explore further the details of particular
countries and events in their own written assignments and in supplementary
reading.
This course has the following
goals: 1) to introduce students to major concepts, debates and approaches in
comparative politics, 2) to illustrate political problems using selected case
studies of countries and events, 3) to convey a sense of the diversity and
complexity of politics, 4) to encourage students to develop sophisticated
individual research strategies, through critical reading, discussion of
research methods and sources, and work on a sustained research paper. Lectures
will focus on concepts, debates and 2
case
studies; discussion sections will allow students to discuss the readings in
more depth, to practice writing, and to consider the value of diverse research
approaches.
Course Readings:
The course readings include the
textbook (in the University Bookstore) as well as additional required readings
which have been placed on reserve in McOdrum Library. All readings listed are
required unless otherwise specified. The course textbook is:
John T. Ishiyama, Comparative
Politics: Principles of Democracy and Democratization Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
* (Note: the textbook is a
source of assigned readings. The instructor does not use for course purposes
ANY online resources that may accompany this textbook).
cuLearn:
Many of the course materials,
including course outline and case studies, will be available on cuLearn, which
is Carleton University’s online learning tool. You can log into cuLearn by
clicking the designated button found in the top right of Carleton University’s
homepage (www.carleton.ca), or by going to the cuLearn Website at
www.carleton.ca/cuLearn
Course Requirements:
An explanation of each
component follows the list of course requirements.
15% Attendance and
participation in discussion sections, to be held weekly. The mark for this
component of the course will be based on attendance and participation for
discussion sessions from September 24 to December 3 inclusive. Students attend
the discussion group in which they registered. Check Carleton Central for the
correct section, time and place.
15% Midterm test, in class, October
15.
20% first case study written
assignment due October 29, based on one of case studies #1-5, to be submitted
online at cuLearn according to instructions below.
20% second case study written
assignment due November 26, based on one of case studies #6-10, to be submitted
online at cuLearn according to instructions below.
30% final examination (in the
scheduled examination period, December 6-19)
Total 100%
Attendance and
participation: Students are required to attend weekly discussion groups with a
teaching assistant (TA) once the groups have been organized early in the fall
term. TAs will record attendance, and students are expected to come to
discussion groups prepared to discuss the readings, as well as any discussion
questions posted on cuLearn in advance. Discussion group activities may
include group work and/or in-class written assignments. Attendance and
participation will be given equal weight in marking: a student who attends
every discussion group, but does not participate actively, can expect to
receive a mark of 7.5/15 for this component.
Midterm
Test: October 15. The test will be multiple choice and will be based on
material from lectures, readings, and discussion groups held up to and
including October 1. Students will have one hour (sixty minutes) to complete
the test. University examination regulations will apply; for example, students
may not refer to books, notes or other materials during the test; must put
laptops and computers under their desks for the duration of the exam; and must
bring ID to the test. University examination rules can be found online at
http://www5.carleton.ca/exams/rules-and-procedures/
Case study written assignments:
Each week from week 1 to week
11 (except for week 5), a short case study with a question for discussion will
be posted to cuLearn approximately one week before class. Students are
expected to read these case studies in advance of the class for which they are
assigned (with the exception of the first day of class, when we will examine
the first case study at the lecture). Students will write two assignments, one
each on a different case study of their choice among the ten case studies to be
considered. The first paper is due October 29; the second is due November 26.
Assignments are to be submitted online at CuLearn as a pdf, or in Word 2003 or
2007. The requirements for each case study assignment are as follows:
n The
written assignment must be brief: maximum 750 words. (Given the brevity of the
assignment, you are advised to avoid elaborate introductions and conclusions). The
assignment is NOT a five-paragraph essay, but an exercise in formulating
arguments, writing concisely, and analyzing evidence.)
n The
first case study assignment must be based on one of Case studies #1-5; the
second assignment must be based on one of Case studies #6-10.
n The
paper must include: a) a brief hypothesis in response to the question posed at
the end of the case study b) at least three specific pieces of evidence that
could prove or disprove the hypothesis, c) an alternative hypothesis on the
question and a comment on its relevance in light of the evidence found d) a
brief discussion of one or more countries that would be relevant to future
research on the topic, explaining why that country is relevant.
n The
assignment must be written in prose, in complete sentences and paragraphs. It
should flow cohesively as a single document, rather than as an assembly of
separate components. See additional requirements for written work below.
n In
addition to the 750 words, students will attach a bibliography to include at
least five peer-reviewed or primary sources (and other sources, if used) to
indicate the references used in the paper.
Students who wish a chance
to improve their mark on the first paper will be permitted to re-write and
re-submit the assignment by December 3, provided that they revise their
original assignment on the original topic, and submit it directly to the
professor in a hard copy in person on or before the deadline. The
title page of the paper must clearly indicate that it is a revised version of
the first paper. If the submitted new version of the first assignment is on a
different topic than the original assignment, then the original mark on the
original paper will stand. If a student revises and re-submits his/her original
paper, then the mark on the revised paper will be the one that counts towards
the final mark even if that mark is lower than the original version.
Final
Examination: will cover all course material, including all readings and
lectures, and take place in the regularly scheduled exam period (December
6-19).
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
PROFESSOR
The professor holds
scheduled office hours that are specifically dedicated to answering questions
from students. Students are encouraged to come to these office hours. When
students have questions related to the course material, the content of
assignments, and research strategies, it is useful to discuss those questions
in person with the professor or the teaching assistant. Do not hesitate to ask
for help in finding research sources, or to ask further questions about
material covered in course lectures. Students may also contact the professor to
make an appointment for a meeting time outside of office hours. Students can
use e-mail to contact the professor; e-mail communication works best for brief
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writers, classified by epochs and
countries, and a valuable
discussion of the divisions of
political economy by various
writers, and its relation to
other sciences. It is a very
desirable little hand-book.
McCulloch, in his “Introduction
to the Wealth of Nations,” gives
a brief sketch of the growth
of economic doctrine. The editor
begs to acknowledge his
great indebtedness for
information to his colleague, Professor
Charles F. Dunbar, of Harvard
University.
Systematic study for an
understanding of the laws of political
[002] economy is to be found no
farther back than the sixteenth
century. The history of political
economy is not the history of
economic institutions, any more
than the history of mathematics
is the history of every object
possessing length, breadth, and
thickness. Economic history is
the story of the gradual evolution
in the thought of men of an
understanding of the laws which
to-day constitute the science we
are studying. It is essentially
modern.1
Aristotle2 and Xenophon had some
comprehension of the
theory of money, and Plato3 had
defined its functions with some
accuracy. The economic laws of
the Romans were all summed
up in the idea of enriching the
metropolis at the expense of
the dependencies. During the
middle ages no systematic study
was undertaken, and the nature of
economic laws was not even
suspected.
It is worth notice that the first
glimmerings of political
economy came to be seen through
the discussions on money, and
1 Yet Blanqui diffusively gives
nearly one half of his “History of Political
Economy” to the period before the
sixteenth century, when politico-economic
laws had not yet been recognized.
A. L. Perry, “Political Economy” (eighteenth
edition, 1883), also devotes
thirty-five out of eighty-seven pages to the period
in which there was no systematic
study of political economy.
2 Xenophon, “Means of increasing
the Revenues of Attika,” ch. ix; also see
his “Economics;” and Aristotle, “Politics,”
b. i, ch. vi, b. iii, ch. i.
3 “Republic,” b. ii.
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 9
the extraordinary movements of
gold and silver. About the time
of Charles V, the young study was
born, accompanied by the
revival of learning, the
Reformation, the discovery of America,
and the great fall in the value
of gold and silver. Modern society
was just beginning, and had
already brought manufactures into
existence—woolens in England,
silks in France, Genoa, and
Florence; Venice had become the
great commercial city of
the world; the Hanseatic League
was carrying goods from the
Mediterranean to the Baltic; and
the Jews of Lombardy had by
that time brought into use the
bill of exchange. While the supply
of the precious metals had been
tolerably constant hitherto, the
steady increase of business
brought about a fall of prices. From
the middle of the fourteenth to
the end of the fifteenth century
the purchasing power of money
increased in the ratio of four [003]
to ten. Then into this situation
came the great influx of gold
and silver from the New World.
Prices rose unequally; the
trading and manufacturing classes
were flourishing, while others
were depressed. In the sixteenth
century the price of wheat
tripled, but wages only doubled;
the laboring-classes of England
deteriorated, while others were
enriched, producing profound
social changes and the well-known
flood of pauperism, together
with the rise of the mercantile
classes. Then new channels of
trade were opened to the East and
West. Of course, men saw but
dimly the operation of these
economic causes; although the books
now began to hint at the right
understanding of the movements
and the true laws of money.
Even before this time, however,
Nicole Orêsme, Bishop
of Lisieux (died 1382), had
written intelligently on money;4
but, about 1526, the astronomer
Copernicus gave a very good
exposition of some of the
functions of money. But he, as well as
4 Roscher exhumed this book,
entitled “De Origine, Natura, Jure et
Mutationibus Monetarum,” and it
was reprinted in 1864 by Wolowski at Paris,
together with the treatise of
Copernicus, “De Monetae Cudendae Ratione.”
10 Principles Of Political
Economy
Latimer,5 while noticing the
economic changes, gave no correct
explanation. The Seigneur de
Malestroit, a councilor of the King
of France, however, by his errors
drew out Jean Bodin6 to say
that the rise of prices was due
to the abundance of money brought
from America. But he was in
advance of his time, as well as
William Stafford,7 the author of
the first English treatise on
money, which showed a perfect
insight into the subject. Stafford
[004] distinctly grasped the idea
that the high prices brought no loss
to merchants, great gain to those
who held long leases, and loss
to those who did not buy and
sell; that, in reality, commodities
were exchanged when money was
passed from hand to hand.
Such was the situation8 which
prefaced the first general system
destined to be based on supposed
economic considerations,
wrongly understood, to be sure,
but vigorously carried out. I
refer to the well-known
mercantile system which over-spread
Europe.9 Spain, as the first
receiver of American gold and
silver, attributed to it abnormal
power, and by heavy duties and
prohibitions tried to keep the
precious metals to herself. This led
to a general belief in the tenets
of the mercantile system, and its
5 Sermon at St. Paul's Cross,
1549 (also see Jacob, “On the Precious Metals,”
pp. 244, 245).
6 1530-1596. See II.
Baudrillart's “J. Bodin et son temps” (Paris, 1853). Bodin
wrote “Réponse aux paradoxes de
M. de Malestroit touchant l'enchérissement
de toutes les choses et des
monnaies” (1568), and “Discours sur le rehaussement
et la diminution des monnaies”
(1578).
7 “A Briefe Conceipte of English
Policy” (1581). The book was published
under the initials “W. S.,” and
was long regarded as the production of
Shakespere.
8 For information on this as well
as a later period, consult Jacob “On the
Precious Metals” (1832), a
history of the production and influences of gold
and silver from the earliest
times. He is considered a very high authority.
Humboldt's “Essay on New Spain” gives
estimates and facts on the production
of the precious metals in
America. A very excellent study has been made
by Levasseur in his “Histoire des
classes ouvrières en France jusqu'à la
Révolution.” For pauperism and
its history, Nicholl's “History of the Poor
Laws” is, of course, to be
consulted.
9 See Cossa, “Guide,” p. 119.
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 11
adoption by all Europe. 1. It was
maintained that, where gold and
silver abounded, there would be
found no lack of the necessaries
of life; 2. Therefore governments
should do all in their power
to secure an abundance of money.
Noting that commerce and
political power seemed to be in
the hands of the states having the
greatest quantity of money, men
wished mainly to create such a
relation of exports and imports
of goods as would bring about
an importation of money. The
natural sequence of this was, the
policy of creating a favorable “balance
of trade” by increasing
exports and diminishing imports,
thus implying that the gain in
international trade was not a
mutual one. The error consisted
in supposing that a nation could
sell without buying, and in
overlooking the instrumental
character of money. The errors
even went so far as to create
prohibitory legislation, in the hope
of shutting out imported goods
and keeping the precious metals
at home. The system spread over
Europe, so that France (1544) [005]
and England (1552) forbade the
export of specie. But, with the
more peaceful conditions at the
end of the sixteenth century, the
expansion of commerce, the value
of money became steadier,
and prices advanced more slowly.
Italian writers were among the
first to discuss the laws
of money intelligently,10 but a
number of acute Englishmen
enriched the literature of the
subject,11 and it may be said that
10 See Antonio Serra, “Breve
Trattato delle Cause che possono fare abbondare
li Regni d' Oro e d' Argento,”
Naples, 1613.
11 Thomas Mun, “England's
Treasure by Foreign Trade” (published in 1640
and 1664); “Advice of the Council
of Trade” (1660), in Lord Overstone's
“Select Tracts on Money”; Sir
William Petty, “Political Arithmetic,” etc.
(about 1680); Sir Josiah Child, “New
Discourse of Trade” (1690); Sir Dudley
North, “Discourse on Trade”
(1691); Davenant's Works (1690-1711); Joshua
Gee, “Trade and Navigation of
Great Britain” (1730); Sir Matthew Decker
(according to McCulloch, William
Richardson), “Essay on the Causes of the
Decline of Foreign Trade” (1744);
Sir James Steuart, “An Inquiry into the
Principles of Political Economy”
(1767). For this period also consult Anderson's
“History of Commerce” (1764),
Macpherson's “Annals of Commerce” (1803),
and Lord Sheffield's “Observations
on the Commerce of the American States”
12 Principles Of Political
Economy
any modern study of political
economy received its first definite
impulse from England and France.
The prohibition of the export of
coin was embarrassing to the
East India Company and to
merchants; and Mun tried to show
that freedom of exportation would
increase the amount of gold
and silver in a country, since
the profits in foreign trade would
bring back more than went out. It
probably was not clear to them,
however, that the export of
bullion to the East was advantageous,
because the commodities brought
back in return were more
valuable in England than the
precious metals. The purpose of
the mercantilists was to increase
the amount of gold and silver
in the country. Mun, with some
penetration, had even pointed
out that too much money was an
evil; but in 1663 the English
Parliament removed the
restriction on the exportation of coin.
[006] The balance-of-trade
heresy, that exports should always exceed
imports (as if merchants would
send out goods which, when paid
for in commodities, should be
returned in a form of less value
than those sent out!), was the
outcome of the mercantile system,
and it has continued in the minds
of many men to this day. The
policy which aimed at securing a
favorable balance of trade, and
the plan of protecting home
industries, had the same origin. If all
consumable goods were produced at
home, and none imported,
that would increase exports, and
bring more gold and silver into
the country. As all the countries
of Europe had adopted the
mercantile theory after 1664,
retaliatory and prohibitory tariffs
were set up against each other by
England, France, Holland,
and Germany. Then, because it was
seen that large sums were
paid for carrying goods, in order
that no coin should be required
to pay foreigners in any branch
of industry, navigation laws
were enacted, which required
goods to be imported only in
ships belonging to the importing
nation. These remnants of the
mercantile system continue to
this day in the shipping laws of
(1783).
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 13
this and other countries.12
A natural consequence of the
navigation acts, and of the
mercantile system, was the
so-called colonial policy, by which
the colonies were excluded from
all trade except with the mothercountry.
A plantation like New England,
which produced
commodities in competition with
England, was looked upon
with disfavor for her enterprise;
and all this because of the
fallacy, at the foundation of the
mercantile system, that the gain [007]
in international trade is not
mutual, but that what one country
gains another must lose.13
An exposition of mercantilism
would not be complete without
a statement of the form it
assumed in France under the guidance of
Colbert,14 the great minister of
Louis XIV, from 1661 to 1683. In
order to create a favorable
balance of trade, he devoted himself to
fostering home productions, by
attempts to abolish vexatious tolls
and customs within the country,
and by an extraordinary system
of supervision in manufacturing
establishments (which has been
the stimulus to paternal government
from which France has never
12 The English Navigation Act of
1651 is usually described as the cause of
the decline of Dutch shipping.
The taxation necessitated by her wars is rather
the cause, as history shows it to
us. Sir Josiah Child (1668 and 1690) speaks
of a serious depression in
English commerce, and says the low rate of interest
among the Dutch hurts the English
trade. This does not show that the acts
greatly aided English shipping.
Moreover, Gee, a determined partisan of the
mercantile theory, says, in 1730,
that the ship-trade was languishing. Sir
Matthew Decker (1744) confirms
Gee's impressions. It looks very much as if
the commercial supremacy of
England was acquired by internal causes, and in
spite of her navigation acts. The
anonymous author of “Britannia Languens”
confirms this view.
13 This was, in substance, the
whole teaching of one of the leading and most
intelligent writers, Sir James
Steuart (1767), “Principles of Political Economy.”
See also Held's “Carey's
Socialwissenschaft und das Merkantilsystem” (1866),
which places Carey among the
mercantilists.
14 Forbonnais, “Récherches sur
les finances de la France” (1595-1721); Pierre
Clément, “Histoire de Colbert et
de son administration” (1874); “Lettres,
instructions et mémoires de
Colbert” (1861-1870); “Histoire du système
protecteur en France” (1854);
Martin, “Histoire de France,” tome xiii.
14 Principles Of Political
Economy
since been able to free herself).
Processes were borrowed from
England, Germany, and Sweden, and
new establishments for
making tapestries and silk goods
sprang up; even the sizes of
fabrics were regulated by
Colbert, and looms unsuitable for these
sizes destroyed. In 1671
wool-dyers were given a code of detailed
instructions as to the processes
and materials that might be used.
Long after, French industry felt
the difficulty of struggling with
stereotyped processes. His
system, however, naturally resulted
in a series of tariff measures
(in 1664 and 1667). Moderate duties
on the exportation of raw
materials were first laid on, followed
by heavy customs imposed on the
importation of foreign goods.
The shipment of coin was
forbidden; but Colbert's criterion of
prosperity was the favorable
balance of trade. French agriculture
was overlooked. The tariff of
1667 was based on the theory that
foreigners must of necessity buy
French wines, lace, and wheat;
that the French could sell, but
not buy; but the act of 1667 cut
[008] off the demand for French
goods, and Portuguese wines came
into the market. England and
Holland retaliated and shut off the
foreign markets from France. The
wine and wheat growers of the
latter country were ruined, and
the rural population came to the
verge of starvation. Colbert's
last years were full of misfortune
and disappointment; and a new
illustration was given of the
fallacy that the gain from
international trade was not mutual.
From this time, economic
principles began to be better
apprehended. It is to be noted
that the first just observations arose
from discussions upon money, and
thence upon international
trade. So far England has
furnished the most acute writers: now
France became the scene of a new
movement. Marshal Vauban,15
the great soldier, and
Boisguillebert16 both began to emphasize
the truth that wealth really
consists, not in money alone, but in
an abundance of commodities; that
countries which have plenty
of gold and silver are not
wealthier than others, and that money
15 “Dîme royale” (1707).
16 “Factum de la France” (1707).
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 15
is only a medium of exchange. It
was not, however, until 1750
that evidences of any real
advance began to appear; for Law's
famous scheme (1716-1720) only
served as a drag upon the
growth of economic truth. But in
the middle of the eighteenth
century an intellectual revival
set in: the “Encyclopædia” was
published, Montesquieu wrote his “l'Ésprit
des Lois,” Rousseau
was beginning to write, and
Voltaire was at the height of his
power. In this movement political
economy had an important
share, and there resulted the
first school of Economists, termed
the Physiocrats.
The founder and leader of this
new body of economic thinkers
was François Quesnay,17 a
physician and favorite at the court [009]
of Louis XV. Passing by his ethical
basis of a natural order of
society, and natural rights of
man, his main doctrine, in brief, was
that the cultivation of the soil
was the only source of wealth; that
labor in other industries was
sterile; and that freedom of trade was
a necessary condition of healthy
distribution. While known as the
“Economists,” they were also
called the “Physiocrats,”18 or the
“Agricultural School.” Quesnay
and his followers distinguished
between the creation of wealth
(which could only come from
the soil) and the union of these
materials, once created, by labor
in other occupations. In the
latter case the laborer did not, in
their theory, produce wealth. A
natural consequence of this view
appeared in a rule of taxation,
by which all the burdens of state
17 When Quesnay was sixty-one
years old he wrote the article, “Fermiers,”
in the “Encyclopædia” (of Diderot
and D'Alembert) in 1756; article “Grains,”
in the same, 1757; “Tableau
économique,” 1758; “Maximes générales
du gouvernement économique d'un royaume”;
“Problème économique”;
“Dialogues sur le commerce et sur
les travaux des artisans”; “Droit natural”
(1768). “Collection des
principaux économistes,” edited by E. Daire (1846), is
a collection containing the works
of Quesnay, Turgot, and Dupont de Nemours.
See also Lavergne, “Les
économistes françaises du 18
e
siècle” (1870); and H.
Martin, “Histoire de France.”
Quesnay's “Tableau économique” was the Koran
of the school.
18 From ÇÁqķùÂ
ÄÆ Æ{õÉÂ,
as indicating a reverence for natural laws.
16 Principles Of Political
Economy
expenditure were laid upon the
landed proprietors alone, since
they alone received a surplus of
wealth (the famous net produit)
above their sustenance and
expenses of production. This position,
of course, did not recognize the
old mercantile theory that foreign
commerce enriched a nation solely
by increasing the quantity of
money. To a physiocrat the wealth
of a community was increased
not by money, but by an abundant
produce from its own soil. In
fact, Quesnay argued that the
right of property included the right
to dispose of it freely at home
or abroad, unrestricted by the state.
This doctrine was formulated in
the familiar expression, “Laissez
faire, laissez
passer.”19
Condorcet and Condillac favored the
new ideas. The “Economists”
became the fashion in France; and
even included in their number
Joseph II of Austria, the Kings of
[010] Spain, Poland, Sweden,
Naples, Catharine of Russia, and the
Margrave of Baden.20 Agriculture,
therefore, received a great
stimulus.
Quesnay had many vigorous
supporters, of whom the most
conspicuous was the Marquis de
Mirabeau21 (father of him of
the Revolution), and the
culmination of their popularity was
reached about 1764. A feeling
that the true increase of wealth
was not in a mere increase of
money, but in the products of
the soil, led them naturally into
a reaction against mercantilism,
but also made them dogmatic and
overbearing in their one-sided
system, which did not recognize
that labor in all industries
19 The words were not invented by
Quesnay, but formed the phrase of a
merchant, Legendre, in addressing
Colbert; although it was later ascribed, as
by Perry, “Political Economy” (p.
46), and Cossa (p. 150), to one of the
Economists, Gournay. (See
Wolowski, in his Essay prefixed to “Roscher's
Political Economy,” p. 36,
American translation.)
20 The Margrave Karl Friedrich
was the author of “Abrégé des principes de
l'économie politique” (1775), and
applied the physiocratic system of taxation
to two of his villages with
disastrous results.
21 He published a first work on “Population”
(1756); the “Théorie de l'impôt”
(1760); and “Philosophie rurale”
(1763). In this latter work Mirabeau adopted
the “Tableau économique” as the
key to the subject, and classed it with the
discovery of printing and of
money.
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 17
created wealth. As the mercantile
system found a great minister
in Colbert to carry those
opinions into effect on a national scale,
so the Physiocrats found in
Turgot22 a minister, under Louis XVI,
who gave them a national field in
which to try the doctrines of
the new school. Benevolently
devoted to bettering the condition
of the people while Intendant of
Limoges (1751), he was made
comptroller-general of the
finances by Louis XVI in 1774. Turgot
had the ability to separate
political economy from politics, law,
and ethics. His system of freeing
industry from governmental
interference resulted in
abolishing many abuses, securing a freer
movement of grain, and in
lightening the taxation. But the
rigidity of national prejudices
was too strong to allow him [011]
success. He had little tact, and
raised many difficulties in his
way. The proposal to abolish the corvées
(compulsory repair of
roads by the peasants), and
substitute a tax on land, brought his
king into a costly struggle
(1776), and attempts to undermine
Turgot's power were successful.
With his downfall ended the
influence of the Economists. The
last of them was Dupont de
Nemours,23 who saw a temporary
popularity of the Physiocrats
22 In 1742 Turgot, when scarcely
twenty, appeared as a sound writer on Paper
Money in letters to Abbé Cicé.
The physiocratic doctrines were presented in a
more intelligible form in his
greater work, “Réflexions sur la formation et la
distribution des richesses”
(1766). Three works of Turgot, on mining property,
interest of money, and freedom in
the corn-trade, bear a high reputation.
For works treating of Turgot, see
Batbie, “Turgot, philosophe, économiste et
administrateur” (1861); Mastier, “Turgot,
sa vie et sa doctrine” (1861); Tissot,
“Turgot, sa vie, son
administration et ses ouvrages” (1862).
23 He was the editor of the works
of Quesnay and Turgot, and wrote a
“Mémoire de Turgot” (1817). He
opposed the issue of assignats during the
French Revolution, and, falling
into disfavor, he barely escaped the scaffold.
Having been a correspondent of
Jefferson's, when Napoleon returned from
Elba, he came to America, and
settled in Delaware, where he died in 1817.
The connection between the
Economists and the framers of our Constitution is
interesting, because it explains
some peculiarities introduced into our system
of taxation in that document. The
only direct taxes recognized by the Supreme
Court under our Constitution are
the poll and land taxes; and it is in this
connection that the
constitutionality of the income-tax (a direct tax) is doubted.
18 Principles Of Political
Economy
in the early years of the French
Revolution, when the Constituent
Assembly threw the burden of
taxes on land. But the fire blazed
up fitfully for a moment, only to
die away entirely.
All this, however, was the slow
preparation for a newer
and greater movement in political
economy than had yet been
known, and which laid the
foundation of the modern study as
it exists to-day. The previous
discussions on money and the
prominence given to agriculture
and economic considerations by
the Economists made possible the
great achievements of Adam
Smith and the English school. A
reaction in England against the
mercantile system produced a
complete revolution in political
economy. Vigorous protests
against mercantilism had appeared
long before,24 and the true
functions of money had come to
be rightly understood.25 [012] More
than that, many of the most
important doctrines had been
either discussed, or been given
to the public in print. It is at
least certain that hints of much
that made so astonishing an
effect in Adam Smith's “Wealth of
Nations” (1776) had been given to
the world before the latter was
written. To what sources, among
the minor writers, he was most
indebted, it is hard to say. Two,
at least, deserve considerable
attention, David Hume and Richard
Cantillon. The former
published his “Economic Essays”
in 1752, which contained
what even now would be considered
enlightened views on
money, interest, balance of
trade, commerce, and taxation; and
a personal friendship existed
between Hume and Adam Smith
dating back as far as 1748, when
the latter was lecturing in
Edinburgh on rhetoric. The extent
of Cantillon's acquirements
24 One of the earliest is that of
Roger Coke (1675), in which he argues for
free trade, and attacks the
navigation acts. Sir Dudley North's “Discourse on
Trade” (1691) urges that the
whole world, as regards trade, is but one people,
and explains that money is only
merchandise.
25 Joseph Harris, an official in
the London Mint, published a very clear
exposition of this subject in his
“Essay upon Money and Coins” (1757); but,
eighty years before, Rice Vaughan
had given a satisfactory statement in his
“Treatise of Money.”
A Sketch Of The History Of
Political Economy. 19
and Adam Smith's possible
indebtedness to him have been but
lately recognized. In a recent
study26 on Cantillon, the late
Professor Jevons has pointed out
that the former anticipated
many of the doctrines later
ascribed to Adam Smith, Malthus,
and Ricardo. Certain it is that
the author of the “Wealth of
Nations” took the truth wherever
he found it, received substantial
suggestions from various sources,
but, after having devoted
himself in a peculiarly
successful way to collecting facts, he
wrought out of all he had
gathered the first rounded system of
political economy the world had
yet known; which pointed out
that labor was at the basis of
production, not merely in agriculture,
as the French school would have
it, but in all industries; and
which battered down all the
defenses of the mediæval mercantile
system. In a marked degree Adam
Smith27 combined a logical
precision and a power of
generalizing results out of confused data [013]
with a practical and intuitive
regard for facts which are absolutely
necessary for great achievements
in the science of political
economy. At Glasgow (1751-1764)
Adam Smith gave lectures on
natural theology, ethical
philosophy, jurisprudence, and political
economy, believing that these
subjects were complementary to
26 “Contemporary Review,”
January, 1881, “Richard Cantillon.” Adam Smith
had quoted Cantillon on his
discussion of the wages of labor, b. i, ch. viii, and
evidently knew his book.
27 Born in 1723, and died 1790;
he was eleven years younger than Hume.
A Professor of Logic (1751) and
Moral Philosophy (1752) at Glasgow, he
published a treatise on ethical
philosophy, entitled the “Theory of Moral
Sentiments” (1739). Dugald
Stewart is the authority as to Smith's life, having
received information from a
contemporary of Smith's, Professor Miller (see
Playfair's edition of Smith's
works); for Adam Smith destroyed all his own
papers in his last illness. His
lectures on political economy at Glasgow outlined
the results as they appeared in
the “Wealth of Nations”; it was not until 1764
that he resigned his
professorship, and spent two years on the Continent (twelve
months of this in France). On his
return home he immured himself for ten
years of quiet study, and
published the “Wealth of Nations” in 1776. (See
also McCulloch's introduction to
his edition of the “Wealth of Nations,” and
Bagehot's “Economic Studies,”
Fall 2012
Introduction to United States Politics
Monday 11:35 am – 1:25 pm
Please
confirm location on Carleton Central
This course provides an introduction to unique aspects of the U.S.
political system. It is vital for students to understand that the institutional
framework of three separated and co-equal branches (legislative, executive and
judicial) sets the stage on which the drama of U.S. politics gets played out
daily. We look at both the U.S. Constitution and its evolution in the eyes of the
Supreme Court to understand the constitutional bases of the separation of
powers and checks and balances. This is vital to understanding that certain
branches are allowed to do certain things and others are not. This course uses
the institutional division of powers both “horizontally” (at one level) and
vertically, through federalism (dividing powers between national, state and
city levels) as a backdrop to examining current controversial issues. It is my
contention that in many ways, the Founding Fathers who wrote the Constitution
in 1787 would not recognize the current institutional framework of US politics,
given that in so many ways, the fundamentals of the system have been changed to
accommodate the wealthy. We will ponder the many significant changes that have
been brought to the system and their implications for the US democratic
process.
In comparing the “textbook”
version of US Politics with how self-starting politicians actually operate in
the system, we will learn about some of the key evolutions in US political
institutions and behaviour. We are fortunate to be following the US 2012
Presidential and Congressional elections which will happen in November.
The following required book has
been ordered for the course, available at Haven Books on Sunnyside Ave. There
will likely be a second supplemental book added to the course.
1) O'Connor and Sabato, American Government, Roots and
Reform (2011 edition)
2) John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change (Harper,
2010)
Course
requirements:
Since this course is one in
which each week builds upon previous weeks’ knowledge, it is crucial to keep up
with the readings and to be able to discuss them in class. It is equally vital
that you let me know if you don’t understand something and we can take time in
class to discuss the 2
question
(since it is very likely more than one person will have the same question) and
feel free to come to my office hours (or by appointment).
Note: ALL written work must be
turned in to pass this course. Regarding late papers, I deduct 1/3 of a grade
for each day missed.
Re: TA Groups: you are allowed two unexcused absences per
term from TA groups. Otherwise attendance is mandatory and will be kept each
week. You MUST attend and participate in TA groups in order to pass the course.
American Political Science Review
American Political Science Review
American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 3 August 2012
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000226
The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating
Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975–2005
MALA HTUN University of New Mexico
S. LAUREL WELDON Purdue University Over the past four
decades, violence against women (VAW) has come to be seen as a violation
of human rights and an important concern for social policy.
Yet government action remains uneven. Some countries have adopted comprehensive
policies to combat VAW, whereas others have been slow to address the problem.
Using an original dataset of social movements and VAWpolicies in 70 countries
over four decades, we show that feminist mobilization in civil society—not
intra-legislative political phenomena such as leftist parties or women in
government or economic factors like national wealth—accounts for variation in
policy development. In addition, we demonstrate that autonomous movements
produce an enduring impact on VAWpolicy through the institutionalization of
feminist ideas in international norms. This study brings national and global
civil society into large-n explanations of social policy, arguing that analysis
of civil society in general—and of social movements in particular—is
critical to understanding progressive social policy change.
Violence against women is a global problem. Research from
North America, Europe, Africa, Latin
America, the Middle East, and Asia has found astonishingly high rates of sexual
assault, stalking, trafficking, violence in intimate relationships, and other
violations of women’s bodies and psyches. These assaults violate human rights,
undermine democratic transitions, harm children, and are tremendously
costly.1 Today, violence against women (VAW) Mala Htun is
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of New Mexico, 1915 Roma
Street NE, Albuquerque, NM 87131 (malahtun@unm.edu).
S. Laurel Weldon is Professor of Political Science, Purdue University,
100 N. University Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (weldons@purdue.edu).
The authors are equal contributors to all parts of this
project.
This article is based on work supported by the National
Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant No. 0550240. We thank the NSF (Political
Science Program), Purdue University, and the New School for Social Research for
support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed
in this material are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the
NSF or these other institutions. The authors also thank Ann Clark, Erik Cleven,
Paul Danyi, Cheryl O’Brien, Elisabeth Friedman, Aaron Hoffman,Mark Jones,
BobKulzick,AmyMazur, ScottMainwaring,Leigh Raymond, Nicole Simonelli, TongFi
Kim, Qi Xu, and participants in panels at the American Political Science
Association, Purdue University’s Political Theory and Public Policy Workshop,
and seminars at Cornell University, the University of Minnesota, and Harvard
University for comments and/or helpful suggestions. We are grateful for the assistance
of a superb team of researchers from the New School and Purdue.
1 For excellent overviews of prevalence rates for different
types of violence by country, see Heise (1994) andHeise et al. (1994). For
European research, see Martinez and Schr ¨ ottle (2006). See alsoHEUNI (2010).
For a discussion of different kinds of data in theUnited States, see Greenfeld
(1997). For summaries of police statistics, survey,
and other data for 36 established democracies, see Weldon
(2002a, Appendix A) . For data on effects of violence against women, see also
Chalk and King (1998), Heise (1994), Heise et al. (1994), and Martinez and Schr
¨ ottle (2006). For figures on cost, seeWorld Health Organization (2010). is
widely seen as a question of fundamental human rights. Many national
governments and international organizations have adopted a wide variety of
measures
to address VAW, including legal reform, public education campaigns,
and support for shelters and rape crisis centers. Despite the growing and
deepening consensus
about the nature and costs of violence against women, there
are puzzling differences in national policy. Why do some governments have more
comprehensive policy regimes than others? Why are some governments quick to
adopt policies to address violence, whereas others are slow?
In this article, we present a global comparative analysis of
policies on VAW over four decades. We show that the autonomous mobilization of
feminists in domestic and transnational contexts—not leftist parties, women in
government, or national wealth—is the critical factor accounting for policy
change. Further, our analysis reveals that the impact of global norms on domestic
policy making is conditional on the presence of feminist movements in domestic
contexts, pointing to the importance of ongoing activism and a vibrant civil
society. Public policy scholars have long identified the importance of social
movements in softening up the political environment, changing the national
mood, and putting new issues on the agenda (e.g., Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005;
Kingdon 1984; McAdam and Su 2002; Weldon 2002a; 2011). Democratic theorists
argue that social movements are critical for advancing inclusion and democracy
(Costain 2005; Dryzek 1990; Dryzek et al. 2003; Young 1990; 2000). Yet our
standard cross-national datasets for the study of social policy include few
indicators of this type of political phenomenon. Much of the large-n literature
is statecentric, focusing on the structure of state institutions, such as veto
points, or on formal political actors, such as
political parties and women in legislatures (e.g., Brady 2003;
Daubler 2008; Esping-Anderson 1990; Huber and 548 American Political Science
Review Vol. 106, No. 3
Stephens 2001; Kittilson 2008; Rudra 2002; Schwindt- Bayer
and Mishler 2005; Swank 2001).2 Other crossnational studies focus on economic
factors, such as globalization, women’s labor force participation, or national
wealth (Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Rudra 2002). Existing measures of civil-society-related phenomena are underdeveloped
compared to those pertaining to economic
or political factors. More qualitative historical studies of
social policy do take greater account of civil society, exploring women’s activism,
labor movements, and the ways that civil society and state intertwine (e.g.
Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2003; Mazur 2002; Meyer 2005; Piven and Cloward
[1971] 1993; Skocpol 1992; 2003). However, their nuanced theoretical arguments
tend to get lost in larger scale, cross-national, and cross-regional studies.
This article conceptualizes government action on VAW as a
progressive social policy. Like other social policies, VAWpolicy establishes
and reproduces a particular normative and social order. As a progressive social
policy, it aims to improve the status and opportunities of a historically
disadvantaged group (in this case, women). We argue that autonomous social movements
are critical to understanding the origins of progressive social policies that
explicitly challenge the established social order by reshaping relations among groups.
Autonomous social movements develop oppositional consciousness,
imagine new forms of social organization, and mobilize broad societal action to
generate understanding and support (Mansbridge and Morris 2001; Weldon 2011).
They are essential to catalyzing the process of progressive social policy
change and for its continuation.
2 The power resources school sees class struggle as being
determined by political battles, but even when scholars aim to measure labor mobilization,
they tend to do so by focusing on political parties rather than civil society
itself (e.g., Esping-Anderson 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 2006).
DEFINING GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIVENESS TO
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
No region of the world is immune to violence against women.
Although differing definitions and methodologies mean that data about
prevalence are not strictly comparable across countries, there is sufficient
evidence to show that these problems are serious in all of our study countries
and regions. In Europe, violence against women is far more dangerous to the
femalepopulation than terrorism or cancer (Elman 2007, 85).
As many as 45% of European women have been victims of
physical and/or sexual violence (Martinez and Schro¨ ttle 2006; see alsoCouncil
ofEurope 2006;Elman and Eduards 1991). Rates are similarly high in North America,
Australia, and New Zealand,3 and studies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa
show that violence
against women is ubiquitous.
To identify which policies address violence against women, it
is necessary to understand the causes of violence.
A growing body of research, mainly in the disciplines of
public health, criminology, anthropology, and psychology, shows that the causes
of violence against women in general (and rape and domestic violence in
particular) are complex, operating at multiple levels (e.g., Chalk and King
1994; Crowell and Burgess 1996; Heise 1994; Heise, Ellsberg, and Gottemoeller 1999;
World Health Organization 2010). In addition, this research shows that an
important class of factors at both an individual and societal level are
attitudes about gender (Crowell and Burgess 1996; Davies 1994; Graham-Kevan and
Archer 2003; Johnson 1995).
Cross-cultural studies have found that cultural norms endorsing
male dominance; female economic dependency; patterns of conflict resolution
emphasizing violence, toughness, and honor; and male authority in the family
predict high societal levels of domestic violence and rape (Heise 1994; Heise
et al. 1994; Levinson 1989; Sanday 1981). Social and legal norms may make womenvulnerable
to violence and othersmore likely to
abuse them with the expectation of impunity (Carrillo et al.
2003; World Health Organization 2010). At the level of individual
relationships, the causes of intimate 3 In Canada, about half of all women have
experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime; in the United
States, a national survey found that a quarter of all women experience such
violence (Johnson and Sacco 1995; Tjaden and Thoennes 1998).
In Australia, one national study (1996) found that 3% of
women had been assaulted in the past year and 8% had been assaulted in their
current relationship. In New Zealand, a national study found that 35% of women
had been assaulted in an intimate relationship.
4 For example, a national study of Bangladeshi villages found
that nearly half (47%) of all women reported being subject to male violence in
an intimate relationship. In Korea, an older (1989) national study found that
somewhere between 12% to 38% of adult women were physically assaulted by an
intimate in the last year. Surveys of women in five Latin American countries
found that more than half had suffered violence (Heise 1994). In Africa, rates
of women ever assaulted by an intimate male partner ranged from 13% in South Africa
to 30% in Nigeria (Heise, Ellsberg, and Gottemoeller 1999).
In Morocco, an emergency room in Casablanca reported that 30%
to 40% of women admitted each month suffer injuries from domestic violence
(UNFPA 2007).
Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change August 2012 violence
and rape include sexist attitudes or “gender schemas,” although poor
relationship skills and the victim’s vulnerability (e.g., economic, social, and
legal dependence) also contribute (Brush 2011; Raphael 1996; Crowell and
Burgess 1996;WorldHealth Organization
2010).Thus violence againstwomen is not primarily the result
of “single factor” causes or solely attributable to individual-level risk
factors such as alcohol use or mental illness (Crowell and Burgess 1996; Heise
1994; Heise, Ellsberg, and Gottemoeller 1999;World Health Organization 2010).
There is also an emerging international political consensus about
the causes of violence and about which policy actions would be most likely to
prevent it and provide appropriate services to victims. In adopting the Vienna
Declaration (1993), governments agreed that “[v]iolence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women . .
. it is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a
subordinate position.”
The Beijing Platform for Action, agreed to by 189 governments
and supported by NGOs from 180 countries in 1995, outlines a series of measures
to address violence against women in a wide variety of policy areas.
The research on responses toVAWalso supports this multipronged
approach. It suggests that responding to violence against women requires action
on the many
dimensions and types of abuse that occur in contemporary societies.
Legal reforms need to specify that violence against women is a crime, even
where one might think that general laws against assault and murder should apply
to women (Carrillo et al. 2003; Chalk and King 1994; Crowell and Burgess 1996;
Davies 1994; Martinez and Schro¨ ttle 2006).Counseling, shelters, and other
housing and legal assistance help women leave abusive relationships (Carrillo
et al. 2003; Chalk and King 1994; Martinez and Schro¨ ttle 2006). Training and
dedicated units for police, social workers, judges, and other professionals
improve victims’ experiences with these agencies (Carrillo et al. 2003; Chalk
and King 1994; Martinez and Schro¨ ttle 2006). Specific efforts to address the
concerns of particularly vulnerable populations of women, such as immigrant or
racialized minority women, are also important (Carrillo et al. 2003; Crenshaw
1993; Richie and Kanuha 2000). In addition to responding to victims,
governments can seek to reduce violence through preventive measures such as
public education and social marketing (Carrillo et al. 2003; Chalk and King
1994). Given this array of measures, coordinating efforts are important to
ensure that agencies are working together to redress violence instead of
working at cross-purposes (Chalk and King 1994; Weldon 2002a). We examined each
of these dimensions of government response to violence against women for all
countries in our study. Our index assigns higher values to those policy regimes
that address more types of violence and whose actions span the categories of
services, legal reform, policy coordination, and prevention of violence. This
measure adapts the approach employed by Weldon (2002a; 2006a) for a global
study of VAW by taking account of the different types of violence that might be
salient in different contexts. Assessing this range of policies produces a
score out of a total of 10
points:
i) Three points for services to victims (1 for each of the
following):
- Government funds domestic violence shelters.
- Government funds rape crisis centers.
- Government provides crisis services for other
forms of violence (stalking, female genital mutilation
[FGM], etc.).
ii) Three points for legal reform (1 for each of the following):
- Government has adopted specialized legislation pertaining
to domestic violence.
- Government has adopted specialized legislation pertaining
to sexual assault/rape.
- Government has adopted specialized legalization pertaining
to other forms of violence (such as trafficking, sexual harassment, FGM, etc.).
iii) One point for policies or programs targeted to
vulnerable populations of women (one point for any of the following
programs/policies): Government provides
specialized services to women ofmarginalized groups (defined by ethnicity, race,
etc.).Examples include bilingual hotlines, specialized crisis centers, and
specially trained police.
- Government recognizes violence against women as a basis for
refugee status.
- Government protects immigrant women in abusive relations
from deportation.
iv) One point for training professionals who respond to
victims:
- Government provides training for police, social workers,
nurses, etc.5
v) One point for prevention programs:
- Government funds public education programs or takes other
preventive measures.
5 There is not space here to engage the criticism of the
so-called “professionalization ” of services for VAW. Some critics have argued that
services such as counseling and social work pathologize women victims and do
not advance social change (Elman 2001; Goodey 2004;
Incite! 2007). In contrast, other scholars have argued that
professionalization has furthered feminist principles (Johnson and Zaynullina 2010)
or that the phenomenon of “professionalization” itself is less extensive than
its critics would suggest. For example, shelter workers are not paid high
wages, provided benefits, or treated with the respect
generally accorded professionals, nor are they integrated
into state bureaucracies in the ways the critics suggest, because even shelters
that receive state funding often are largely staffed by volunteers and low-paid
but committed activists (Weldon 2011).
American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 3
vi) One point for administrative reforms:
- Government maintains specialized agency to provide leadership,
coordination, and support for VAW policies across different sectors and levels.
These elements are simply summed so that more points imply more types of
government response. The most responsive governments that adopt the most
comprehensive policies score a 10 and those that do nothing score a zero. Like
the index developed by Weldon (2002a; 2002b; 2006a, 2011), this measure of
policy scope encompasses a variety of different types of policies as way of
getting at the many different dimensions of the problem. Responsiveness means
addressing as many of these dimensions as possible—both responding to current
victims and preventing future violence.6 A team of more than a dozen
researchers gathered data over four years through an intensive review of
primary documents (such as the laws themselves), interviews with legal experts,
and consultation of secondary materials such as law review articles, articles in
peer-reviewed journals and scholarly books, policy briefs, and materials from
NGOs and international organizations. Two or three researchers coded policy in
each country, and there was a high degree of inter-rater agreement. The
principal investigators thoroughly reviewed the codes as well. Researching and
coding these policies and the relevant independent variables to prepare them
for analysis took approximately five years, which is why the most recent year covered
is 2005. Codes and code rules are provided in the supplemental Online Appendix
(available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2012009).
This index does not seek to capture variation in the implementation of policies
against violence.7 In some 6 Because this is a measure of scope, the fact that
a variety of policies are considered is a strength of the measure. Analysis of
each individual item will not tell us about the scope of the policy. Experts have
emphasized, for example, that responding to violence requires legal reform and
provision of shelter and measures such as raising awareness. Moreover, because
this index is based on conceptual, not practical, relatedness, standard
measures used to assess indices (such as Cronbach’s alpha) are inappropriate
for this type of index
construction (seeWeldon 2002a; 2002b; 2006a; 2011).Analysis
of the individual items in the indexmight be interesting for answering other types
of questions (for example, which factors determine whether a response is more
focused on legal reform or changing awareness), but is beyond the scope of this
article. 7 Although the difference between adoption and implementation is conceptually
clear and well established in the policy literature (see, for example, Pressman
andWildavsky 1979), the gap between the two
measures are well funded and executed. In others, reforms
remainmainly “on the books” for a host of reasons. Nor does this study examine
effectiveness (which is conceptually distinct from both implementation and adoption).
Effectiveness depends on sound policy design, state capacity, political will,
and myriad other factors (Franceschet 2010; Weldon 2002a). Even wellintentioned
administrations sometimes adopt ineffective policies (and in fact, some have
argued that effectiveness conflicts with responsiveness; e.g., Rodrik and Zeckhauser
1988). Data for a cross-national study of effectiveness are currently
unavailable. Even nationallevel data suitable for a comprehensive study of
policy implementation have been difficult, if not impossible to come by, except
for narrow studies of policy evaluation in particular locales. Such studies do
not get at the broad character or context of policy responsiveness to violence
against women.
For several reasons a
study of policies on the books is critically important for political
scientists, feminists, and others concerned with human rights and democratic policy
making. First, policies themselves violate women’s human rights when they
discriminate, disadvantage, and silence women and treat them as less than fully
human. More broadly, government action sends a signal about national priorities
and the meaning of citizenship; it also furnishes incentives for the
mobilization of social movements. Second, policies cannot be implemented if
they are never adopted. Although translating law into action often takes time
and effort, the law can be a powerful force for social change. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, knowledge about the best policy design to protect the
human rights ofwomen and/or other groups is not useful for those who wish to promote
human rights if it is irrelevant to what governments are likely to do. What
determines whether governmentswill take action to protect human rights in the
first place? Scholars, activists, and others interested in the question of how
to create the political will to act on violence need to start with studying
policy adoption.
Under what conditions do governments stop discriminating against
women and start combating violence?
Understanding policy adoption is the key to answering this
question.
MOVEMENTS, GLOBAL NORMS,
AND PROGRESSIVE POLICY CHANGE:
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this section we develop a theory of government action on
VAW as social policy and define a particular class of social
policies—progressive social policies—as a type of change for which social
movements are particularly important. In the case of VAW, autonomous police,
but we do not explore how well they do these things, nor do we assess the
reduction in rates of VAW associated with each of these various measures. (Note
that implementation of international treaties by national governments is
sometimes measured in terms of adoption of domestic laws, and this further
muddies the water. We are not using implementation in that sense here). Civic
Origins of Progressive Policy Change August 2012 feminist movements are the
primary drivers of change because they articulate social group perspectives,
disseminate new ideas and frames to the broader public, and demand
institutional changes that recognize these meanings.We explain how
movementsworkwithin and across national borders and how they demand the
creation of new institutions to encode their ideas and to advance feminist
interests. We argue that the impact of movements includes but goes well beyond
agendasetting.
VAW Policy as Progressive Social Policy Although there has
been a dramatic increase in scholarly attention to government action on VAW
over the last decade, scholars of comparative social policy and gender and
politics too rarely examine this important
dimension of women’s citizenship and status. Social policy
refers to an aspect, rather than a specific area, of policy. Social policies
shape the normative and social order, define social groups, and set their
relative
status in social, political, and economic spheres (Marshall
1965; Orloff 1993; Skocpol and Amenta 1986).8 Typically, scholars of social
policy study income maintenance or social insurance policies (“welfare”).
Yet when properly conceptualized, social policy refers to a
much broader array of issues than these stereotypical welfare policies and
includes tax expenditures, veterans benefits, health care, immigration, and
education (Amenta, Bonastia, and Caren 2001). Indeed, scholars of U.S. policy
have made the point that tax policy and military spending are key avenues of
social policy (e.g.,Howard 1997; Skocpol 1992).Because policies on VAWencompass
many different types of social provision, define the rights of citizenship, and
shape the social order between men and women, the study of social policy should
include these efforts to combat VAW.
VAW is a particular category of social policy: a progressive social
policy.Whereas social policies shape the normative and social order and the
relative position of groups, progressive policies explicitly aim to transform and
improve society to advance peace, justice, or equality. Progressive social
policies are distinguished by the specific intention of empowering or improving
the status of groups that have been historically marginalized, excluded, and/or
stigmatized. They include affirmative action in hiring and education, the
extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples, and the adoption of quotas
and reserved seats for political minorities. Policies are only ever progressive
in relation to their social context, and not all policies will be progressive
in every context.Debates over these policies involve conflicting normative
frames, not technical considerations.
Extending marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples
8 This need not imply a benign view of social policies: Some
scholars argue that social policy creates and maintains a social order that is functional
or even necessary for capitalism or broader systems of patriarchy. On this
view, state policies work to regulate and control citizens (Abramovitz 1988;
Offe 1984; Piven and Cloward [1971]
1993). is controversial not because of concerns about how to design
marriage licenses but because of the challenge that same-sex marriage poses to
the historical, institutionalized definition of the family as heterosexual coupling.
By contrast, the questions of whether the Federal Reserve should raise or lower
interest rates or by how much are more technical matters that do not go to the
core of the way our society is organized (c.f. Hall 1993).Controversy on this
score usually centers on whether such measures are appropriate given broader economic
conditions and trends (although the question of whether we should have a
Federal Reserve Board at all does touch on fundamental principles of social
organization). Policies on violence against women are progressive social
policies because, despite the successes outlined later, they challenge social
norms establishing male dominance in sexuality, the family, and the broader
society.
Feminist Movements
and “crimes of honor.” It did not recognize violence against
women as a priority in its own right nor acknowledge the links between various
forms of violence against women and male domination. “Family violence,” FGM,
and other violations of women’s human rights were treated as distinct issues
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Weldon 2006b). Violence against women is rarely raised
as an issue, much less as a priority, without pressure from feminists (Weldon
2002a). This is true even among progressive social justice organizations and
human rights groups (Friedman 1995). Indeed, in her study of interest groups in
theUnited States, Dara Strolovitch (2006) finds that organizations that are not
focused on women (economic justice organizations, organizations focusing on
particular ethnic or racial groups) fail to address VAW, even though women are
clearly part of the group they are representing. This is because they fail to
see it as important for the group more broadly. Similarly, most human rights
groups did not recognize rape and
American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 3
intimate violence as violations of women’s rights until they
were pressed to do so by feminist activists in the 1990s. Indeed, some women
themselves did not (and some still do not) see forced penetration as rape, as
indicated by the title of the classic feminist text, I Never Called it Rape
(Warshaw [1988]1994; see also Estrich 1987). Of course, women knew they had been
assaulted, but they considered it a fact of life, unalterable like earthquakes,
or something that happened only to them. These attitudes persist to some degree
today even in countries with strong feminist movements such as the United
States. For example, a large number of college students in the United States do
not recognize themselves as victims of rape even though the behavior they report
meets the legal definitions of the crime (Fisher, Cullen, and Turner 2000).
Today, in places with less active feminist movements (such as Kuwait), as many women
as men support “rape myths,” that is, commonly believed falsehoods about sexual
assault (Nayak et al. 2003).Despite women’s universal exposure to the threat of
violence and the fact that political leadership on this issue is predominantly
female, one cannot assume that women are aware of, active on, and prioritize this
issue just because they are women. Women outside of women-focused organizations
have rarely articulated and championed issues of rape prevention and intimate
violence in formal public settings, such as legislatures.
Women organizing to advance women’s status have defined the
very concept of VAW, raised awareness, and put the issue on national and global
policy agendas. Feminist movements—as opposed to movements of women organized
for other purposes—were the critical actors. Looking at 36 stable democracies
from 1974–94, Weldon (2002a) found that in each of these instances strong,
autonomous women’smovementswere the first to articulate the issue of violence
against women and were the key catalysts for government action. Government action
on violence is usually adopted in response to domestic or transnational
activists demanding action from the outside. Although individual women, sometimes
female legislators, have become spokespersons on the issue, they generally owed
their awareness and motivation to their participation in or connection to
women’s autonomous organizing (Joachim 1999; Weldon 2011). There are three
reasons why women’s autonomous organizing has played such a critical role.
First, women organizing as women generate social knowledge about women’s
position as a group in society. When social groups self-organize, they develop
an oppositional consciousness as well as a set of priorities that reflect their
distinctive experiences and concerns as a group. This social perspective cannot
be developed in more generally focused organizations or in settings where group
concerns must be subordinated to other sorts of imperatives (Mansbridge 1995;
Mansbridge and Morris 2001; Weldon 2011; Young 2000). When women come together to
discuss their priorities aswomen, the problem of violence comes to the fore
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; ternbach et al. 1992; Weldon 2002a; 2002b; 2006a; 2006b;
2011). This is why the issue of VAW was first articulated by and diffused from
women’s autonomous organizing. Second, the issue of VAW is one that challenges,
rather than reinforces or workswithin, established gender roles in most places
(Gelb and Palley 1996; Htun andWeldon 2010;Weldon 2011). In contrast with more “maternalist”
issues such as maternity leave or child care, for which women can advocate
without deviating too far from traditional gender scripts, addressingVAW requires
challenging male privilege in sexual matters and social norms of male
domination more generally (Brush 2003; Elman 1996; MacKinnon 1989). In
criticizing such violence, women refuse to be silent victims.
Women are more likely to speak up in spaces that are secure
from bureaucratic reprisals from superiors and/or social censure. For example,
activists attempting to raise the issue of violence in Sweden were
characterized as shrill and divisive, and prominent feminist bureaucrats lost
their jobs when they were unwilling to attribute male violence against women to
individual pathologies such as alcoholism (Elman 1996). It is difficult for
legislative insiders (members of legislatures and bureaucrats) to take on
social change issues without the political support of broader mobilization.
The third reason why autonomous self-organization is so
powerful concerns the way social privilege shapes organizational
agenda-setting. Agenda-setting means identifying and ordering priorities
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962). When women’s movements are organized within broader
political institutions such as political parties or are entirely contained in
the state, they must argue for the relevance of their concerns to these
established, often already defined priorities. In these contexts, women’s
concerns are often seen as tangential to established priorities or as
secondary, less important issues.Organizational imperatives seem to sideline
“women’s” issues such as VAW or equal pay because such issues are perceived as
being of importance “only” to women. This perception results in the
subordination of women’s issues to other, seemingly mor important, established or universal goals such
as environmental protection, better wages and working conditions, or free
elections. Women’s issue fall through the cracks of organizational entities aimed
at purposes other than sex equality, because sex equality is not their explicit
mission (Strolovitch 2006; Weldon 2002a). In contrast, women need not struggle
to get sex equality and women’s empowerment recognized as priorities in
autonomous feminist organizations. They need not highlight their connection to
more general issues or stress their importance to men and children, which means
these issues can be articulated as being important in their own right.
Autonomy as defined here, then, implies independence not only
from the state but also from all institutions with a more general focus. An
autonomous feminist movement is a form of women’s mobilization that is devoted
to promoting women’s status and wellbeing independently of political parties
and other associationsthat do not have the status of women as
Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change August 2012
their main concern.9 For example, if the only women’s organizations
are women’s wings or caucuses within existing political parties, the women’s
movement is not autonomous. “Autonomous organizations. . .are characterized by
independent actions, where women organize on the basis of self-activity, set
their own goals, and decide their own forms of organization and struggle” (Molyneux
1998, 226; see also Bashevkin 1998). Thes organizations must not be subject to
the governance of other political agencies:Autonomous feminist organizations are
not subsidiaries, auxiliaries, or wings of
larger, mixed-sex organizations. In addition to being autonomous,
the women’smovements must also be strong. Extant research suggests that a high
level of mobilization is required for amovement to be influential (Amenta et
al. 2010). Strong women’smovements can command public support and attention,
whereas weaker movements have trouble convincing the media and others that
their positions and opinions are important for public discussion. Note that
strong movements do not always influence policy outcomes (McAdam and Su 2002;
Weldon 2002). How exactly do these autonomous, strong movements exert their
effects? Like other social movements, autonomous feminist organizations
influence policy through a variety of mechanisms. It is well established that
social movements shape public and government agendas and create the political
will to address particular issues.
A Global Ranking of Political Science Departments
Simon Hix
London School of Economics
Rankings of academic institutions are key information tools
for universities, funding agencies, students and faculty. The main method for
ranking departments in political science, through peer evaluations, is
subjective, biased towards established institutions, and costly in terms of time
and money. The alternative method, based on supposedly ‘objective’ measures of
outputs in scientific journals, has thus far only been applied narrowly in
political science, using publications in a small number of US-based journals.
An alternative method is proposed in this paper – that of ranking departments
based on the quantity and impact of their publications in the 63 main political
science journals in a given five-year period. The result is a series of global
and easily updatable rankings that compare well with results produced by
applying a similar method in economics. Rankings of academic institutions are
key information tools for universities, public and private funding agencies,
students and faculty. For example, to investigate whether and why European
universities lag behind their competitors in the US, the European Economics
Association commissioned research into the ranking of economics departments on
a global scale (see, especially, Coupé, 2003).
A variety of different ranking methods have been used in the
natural sciences and have started to emerge in the social sciences, especially
in economics (see, for example, Scott and Mitias, 1996; Dusansky and Vernon,
1998). All methods have disadvantages and trade-offs. Nevertheless, the best
methods tend to have three elements: (1) they rank institutions on a global
scale rather than in a single country; (2) they use ‘objective’ measures of
research outputs, such as publications in journals, rather than subjective peer
evaluations; and (3) they are cheap to update, for example by allowing for
mechanized annual updates. However, no such global, objective or easily updated
method exists in political science. This research aims to fill this gap by
proposing and implementing a new method for ranking departments in this field.
To this end, in the next section I review the existing methods in our
discipline. In the third section I then propose and justify an alternative
method, based on research outputs in the main political science journals in a
particular five-year period. And in the fourth section I present the results of
an analysis of the content of 63 journals between 1993 and 2002.
Existing Rankings of Political Science Departments As in
other disciplines, two main methods have been used to rank political science
departments: peer assessments, and content analysis of scientific journals. However,
both methods, as applied thus far, have their limitations. Peer Assessments The
most widely used method for ranking political science departments is peer assessments
– where senior academics are asked to evaluate the quality of other departments.
For example, this method is used by the US National Research Council and the
U.S. News and World Report to rank doctoral programs in the US (see PS:
Political Science and Politics, 1996a, b), and in the Research Assessment Exercise
in the UK for the allocation of central government research funding. The
problems with this method are well known. First, peer assessments are
subjective, by definition. No ranking method is perfectly ‘objective’. For
example, the content of scientific journals is determined by the subjective
judegments of journal editors and article reviewers. However, journal editors
and article reviewers are experts on the subjects of the papers they publish or
review. Also, peer evaluation in the journal publishing process is repeated
thousands of times, which reduces bias. In contrast, rankings based on periodic
peer assessments rely on a small sample of academics, who cannot possibly be
experts in all areas of research produced by the institutions they rank. As a
result, rankings based on peer assessments are less ‘objective’ than rankings
based on the content analysis of journals (if a sufficiently large sample of
journals is used).
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
294 SIMON HIX
Existing Rankings of Political Science Departments As in
other disciplines, two main methods have been used to rank political science
departments: peer assessments, and content analysis of scientific journals. However,
both methods, as applied thus far, have their limitations. Peer Assessments The
most widely used method for ranking political science departments is peer assessments
– where senior academics are asked to evaluate the quality of other departments.
For example, this method is used by the US National Research Council and the
U.S. News and World Report to rank doctoral programs in the US (see PS:
Political Science and Politics, 1996a, b), and in the Research Assessment Exercise
in the UK for the allocation of central government research funding. The
problems with this method are well known. First, peer assessments are
subjective, by definition. No ranking method is perfectly ‘objective’. For
example, the content of scientific journals is determined by the subjective
judegments of journal editors and article reviewers. However, journal editors
and article reviewers are experts on the subjects of the papers they publish or
review. Also, peer evaluation in the journal publishing process is repeated
thousands of times, which reduces bias. In contrast, rankings based on periodic
peer assessments rely on a small sample of academics, who cannot possibly be
experts in all areas of research produced by the institutions they rank. As a
result, rankings based on peer assessments are less ‘objective’ than rankings
based on the content analysis of journals (if a sufficiently large sample of
journals is used).
The resulting biases of this subjectivity have been well
documented. Because the sample of academics has only limited information about
the output of all institutions, they are forced to base their judgements on other
factors. This results in a bias towards large established departments and
against new and up-and-coming departments (Katz and Eagles, 1996). The overall
reputation of the university has an effect on the respondents’ expected
performance of a political science department – known as the ‘halo effect’
(Lowry and Silver, 1996; Jackman and Siverson, 1996).
Second, the peer assessment method is highly costly and
time-consuming. This is because of the need either to survey a large number of
senior faculty (as in the cases of the US National Research Council and the
U.S. News and World Report) or to prepare and read the submissions of all the
universities (as in the case of the Research Assessment Exercise). Hence,
rankings based on peer assessments are invariably updated only every five years
(in the case of the Research Assessment Exercise and the U.S. News and World
Report) or even longer (in the case of the US National Research Council).
Third, all existing peer assessment rankings are nationally
specific. If similar methods were used in different countries, a global ranking
based on peer assessments could be produced. However, different methods tend to
be used POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENTS 295
in different countries. For example, in the U.S. News and
World Report, departments are scored out of five in a number of criteria, and
then averaged (with the top departments scoring between 4.7 and 4.9). In the
Research Assessment Exercise, departments are scored in bands from 5* to 2
(with the top departments scoring 5*). As a result, relative performance on a
global scale is difficult to establish.
An Alternative Method
Building on existing bibliometric research, the method
proposed here ranks academic institutions on the basis of the quantity and
impact of articles published in the main journals in political science in a
given period. To establish this ranking, decisions were made about the following:
(1) what time period to use; (2) what to count as the ‘main’ political science
journals; (3) what to count as a publication in a journal; (4) how to measure
the impact (‘quality’) of a journal; (5) how to construct a ranking from this
information; and (6) how to create a ‘quasi-error’ term.
Time Period Creating annual rankings would have the advantage
of being able to track short-term changes in the performance of departments.
However, looking at the content of only one year of each journal would be a
small sample size, and so would produce a high degree of measurement error.
Conversely, a new ranking every ten years would be more accurate, but would not
measure more subtle changes. As a result, counting articles on a rolling
five-year basis would probably be the most effective method. This allows for a
larger sample in each journal and allows
a new ranking to be produced every year – in other words, 1993–1997, 1994–1998,
and so on. This is also a similar time period to other rankings, such as the
U.S. News and World Report and the Research Assessment Exercise.
The Main Political Science Journals Four steps were taken to
define the ‘main’ political science journals. Step one involved the full list
of journals in the field in the SSCI, which contained 143 journals in political
science, international relations and public administration in 2002.
Step two involved adding some missing journals to this list.
The SSCI does not include all major political science journals. The Institute
for Scientific Information (ISI) follows a careful procedure for selecting
which journals to include in the SSCI.1 However, several prominent
international political science journals are not listed in the SSCI. For
example, whereas the main journals of the British, German and Scandinavian
political science associations are in the SSCI, the main journals of the
French, Italian and Dutch associations are not. Also, several major sub-field
journals were not included before 2002, such as the Journal of Public Policy,
European Union Politics, Nations and Nationalism, History of Political Thought,
the Journal of Legislative Studies, and Democratization. Adding these journals
to the SSCI list makes a total of 152 journals.2 Step three involved setting
and applying two simple criteria for divining the ‘main’ political science
journals from this list of 152. First, many journals are in fact journals in
other fields of social science, such as law, economics, geography, sociology,
history, psychology, social policy, communications, philosophy, or management.
For the sake of simplicity, a political science journal can be defined as a
journal that is (a) edited by a political scientist and (b) has a majority of
political scientists on its editorial board (in departments or institutes of political
science, politics, government, international relations, public administration or
public policy).
Second, many journals in the SSCI list have a marginal impact
on the discipline of political science. For example, almost one third of the
journals had less than 100 citations to articles published in any issue of
these journals by the articles published in the over 8,000 other journals in
the SSCI in 2002. Removing these non-political-science journals and journals
that have only a marginal impact left 60 journals.
Step four, however, involved adding back three journals that
have a low impact but are the national political science association journals
of three countries: the Australian Journal of Political Science, Politische
Vierteljahresschrift (published by the German political science association)
and Scandinavian Political Studies. It is reasonable to include these journals
despite their low impact, since the ISI had already decided that these are
important journals. In other words, national political science association
journals are included in the analysis either if they are in the SSCI or if they
are not in the SSCI list but receive more than 100 citations per year.
This left 63 journals for the analysis, which are listed in
Table 1. For the 54 journals in the SSCI, data on the content of these journals
between 1993 and 2002 was purchased from the ISI. For the nine journals not in
the SSCI and for the issues of the SSCI journals that are not in the database
(for example, where a journal existed for a number of years prior to being
included in the SSCI), the content was coded by hand. In total, the content of
495 annual volumes was collected electronically and the content of 117 volumes
was collected by hand.
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